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INTRODUCTION
The historical development of the third world comtires
has resulted in an epoch of dependency on the industrialized
nations, for many forms of aids and investment capital. Funda¬
mentally, over the past twenty years the multinational corpora¬
tions have been one of the largest sources of investment capi¬
tal in the third world. However, their presence has been an
increasing source of concern, generating fear, anger and even
hatred. Moreover, in recent times, a deluge of books, disser¬
tations, and articles in scientific journals have been published
concerning the operations of NMCs in the third world.
Among others, some of the most controversial issues
are related to the contribution of the multinational corpora¬
tions in the area of finance, balance of payment and technology.
Contrary to popular beliefs.
The three primary contributions of the MNCs are more
of a myth than reality. The analysis of the contri¬
bution in technology revealed a basic cause of further
unemployment and a further concentration of already
extremely unequal income distribution, while noting
the excessive prices being charged by the MNCs in
transferring this technology. Upon examination, the
financial contribution turns out to be a financial
drain, decreasing both current consumption and avail¬
able local savings and, thus, future consvimption for
the vast majority of lesser developed countries in¬
habitants. The third area of analysis, the balance
of pajnnents contribution, led to similar conclusions.
In contrast to a contribution, the empirical informa¬
tion showed no superior export performance by MNCs
relative to local firms unless it was accompanied by
i
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export underpricing. Concomitantly, exports were
further limited via restrictions placed on their
technology by the MNCs, While potential inflows
were accentuated through import overpricing and
inflated royalty pa3nnents. ^
The purpose of this study is to analyse the contribu¬
tions of the bauxite industry to the Jamaican economy before
and after nationalization. Although nationalization has failed
to resolve some of the major development problems faced by the
country, it has significantly altered the financial returns to
Jamaica flowing from the bauxite industry. One of the major
factors limiting the overall contribution of the industry to
Jamaica is that both prior to and after nationalization, the
major sources of domestic revenue were taxes, royalties, and
wages. This is in contrast to the huge pa3nnents for capital
and other factors of production (excepting labour) which are
still largely foreign owned. An additional limitation is that
the foreign ownership of intermediate inputs have significantly
reduced the backward linkages that are ordinarily associated
with the industry. Finally, despite its participation in the
international bauxite association Jamaica still doesn't exer¬
cise control over pricing, putput, and distribution.
A major criticism of the MNCs is its capacity for tax
avoidance. Where the enterprise is vertically integrated,
transactions tend to be between branches and subsidiaries of
the same company. Accordingly, the local tax authorities
^Charles K. Wilber, ed., "The Political Economy of
Development and Underdevelopment," in The Multinational Cor-
poratioh and the Underdevelopment of t^ Third World, 2nd ed.
(New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 124-151.
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experience difficulties in checking the values assigned to
major cost and revenue item in tax declarations. This usually
leads to a loss of tax revenue for an individual country.
These limiting factors have been the center of controversy
since the North American, French and Swiss bauxite/alximina
companies gained mining rights and subsequently initiated their
operations. In fact, some members of the intellectual class
within Jamaican society, have often accused the industry of
doing nothing more for the economy than at best generating
limited government revenues.
Development of the Buaxite Industry in Jamaica
Just piror to World War II, the economies of the world,
and in particular, the industrialized nations, were focusing
their attention on finding a versatile metal which is light,
and has a combination of strength, conductivity, corrosion
resistance, heat reflectivity, easy maintenance, and most of
all, a low comparative cost to produce.
Shortly thereafter, the mineral bauxite, the raw mate¬
rial from which aluminum is produced was found to contain a
white powder called alumina, which looks very much like fine
salt. This powdery substance was tested to be very light in
weight, strong, capable of being pressed into very thin sheets,
or it can be made to become as hard as iron or steel. Most of
all, this metal provided the versatility which the economists
of the world were looking for. As a consequence of its ver¬
satility, aluminvim has become the world's second most widely
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used metal. Among other things, the metal is used for pro¬
ducing consximer durables, machinery and equipment, containers
and packaging, alxminimi curtains and walls.
Because of the wide use of alxominum, the world demand
for bauxite has extended beyond what the industrialized
nations could supply for their domestic and foreign needs.^
Consequently, to meet this growing demand, the industrialized
world began to look beyond its own boundaries. It was this
drive, to seek other suppliers of baiixite, that resulted in
the alviminiam companies to move into Jamaica, beginning with the
purchase of vast tracks of bauxite land in the forties. "In
1943, Alcoa's former Canadian affiliate, Alcan Alviminum, estab¬
lished Jamaica Bauxite, Limited as a fully owned subsidiary."
"Shortly thereafter, other major North American aluminxim com¬
panies began to explore and make extensive property acquisi¬
tions." "In 1944, Reynolds Metal entered the island and simul¬
taneously began experimentation in the U.S. to develop a process
to handle Jamaican baiixite ores." "Permanent metal ^forerunner
of Kaiser) began to buy bauxite reserves abroad after taking
over excess government smelting capacity in the U.S. following
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the war." The companies purchased over 40,000 acres of bauxite-
righ land in Jamaica, which were to supply Kaiser's smelting
and refining plants for the next two decades.
In the early fifties, the companies began to develop
l"The Gleaner," Historical Overview of the Bauxite/Alu-
mina Industry (Daily GlemlervDecemFeFTITTfTTyT^pT^'anTTrr
2Sharman Welds, The Bataxite Story (Jamaica. W. I.: Jamal
Foundation, 1978), pp.
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their newly acquired reserves. Kaiser built a huge mining
complex on the southwest coast of Jamaica, The company also
developed its own railway line, road network, and port facili¬
ties where the ore could be stored, loaded and shipped abroad
for processing. Alcoa continued to rely on its reserves in
the U.S., Guyana and Surinam until, when it too opened opera¬
tions in Jamaica.
It was not long before the companies began to build
refineries alongside their mines in Jamaica. This phase of
the overseas expansion of the industry was brought about by
pressure from the Jamaican government which wanted a bigger
share of the income generated by the industry.^ For the com¬
panies, the main consideration was economic. By refining the
bauxite to aliamina before sending it to the U.S. for final
smelting into aluminum ingot, the companies could save on the
cost of shipping the bulky ore (four tons of bauxite produce
two tons of alumina which produce one ton of aluminum). As
early as 1953 Alcan built the first alxmina refinery on the
is land--the Kirkvine works-but the major expansion of refining
capacity took place in the early sixties.
The companies' growing reliance on Jamaica, as they
restructured their refining, production and marketing capacity
in North America to accommodate Jamaica baiixite, led to a
dependency which was to later give the Jamaican government
some leverage.
Cherry Keith and Robert Girlin, Bauxite Dependency:
Roots of Crisis (Jamaica, W. I.: UWI, 1977), p. 5.
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1971 1972 1975 1976
GNP 1,089.8 1,198.1 2600.7 2700.2
GNP Per capita 570.2 613 1262.3
Foreign Exchange Reserve 132.2 88.6 62 -200
Exports 600.25 661.5 699.4 -561.6
Imports 966.0 1,085.0 1,021.4 829.8
Main Export Commodities
Alumina 104.3 119.9 303,859.0 272,076.0
% of GNP 9.57 10 11.7 10
% of Total Exports 17.38 18.12 43.4 48.4
Bauxite 74.7 68.4 98.1 112,649.0
% of GNP 6.85 5.7 3.8 4.17
% of Total Exports 12.44 10.34 14.03 20.05
Sugar 11.7 11.8
% of GNP 1.1 .98
% of Total Exports 1.95 1.78
Population (Persons) 1,911,400 1,953,472 2,060,300
Employment (Persons) N/A 611,300 682,300 883,000
Unemployment (Persons) N/A 184,500 175,400 216,400
Per Capita Income (Dollars) 592.4 677.0 1,164.4 1,180.5
Source; 1. Economic Survey Jamaica, 1972, National Planning Agency,
Jamaica.
2. Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1978, International Labor
Office, Geneva.
3. Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, United Nations.
As seen on the table above, the three main exporting
commodities of the Jamaican economy are alumina, bauxite and
sugar. Of these commodities alumina and bauxite are the two
major exports; reflecting the importance of the bauxite/
alumina industry. Before nationalization, in 1971 baioxite
and altmina accounted for an aggregate income of $179 million
or of 16.42 percent of GNP and 29.82 percent of total exports.
In 1972, the two commodities represent an aggregate income of
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$188.4 million or 15.78 percent of GNP, an increase of $9.3
million or 5.2 percent of 1971's income.
After nationalization, in 1975 the aggregate income
of bauxite and alvimina accounted for $401,860,000 or 15.5 per¬
cent of GNP and 57 percent of total exports. In 1976 these
commodities accounted for an aggregate income of $384,725,000
or 14.17 percent of GNP and 68.45 percent of total exports.
Other features worthy of comment, even though limited
by sufficient data, is the declining importance of sugar to
the Jamaican economy. In 1971 its export accounted for 1.1
percent of GNP and 1.95 percent of total exports. In 1972
both GNP and exports of sugar declined to .98 percent and
1.78 percent respectively.
Nationalization As A Strategy of Third
World Development
Nationalization is a process by which economic entities
are
...transferred from private to public ownership, some¬
times with consent of the private owners, more often
without consent; sometimes with fair compensation to
former owners, sometimes without.^
It is typically an instrument used by socialist governments to
give the state exclusive control over all the means of produc¬
tion, and to restrict private property to property in wages.
But nationalization has also been pursued by third world
countries that are not socialists, or adverse to the continuing
^Donald W. Moffat, Economic Dictionary (New York:
Elsevier Publishing Company'^^ 1976) .
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of private ovmership of capital.^ In fact, nationalization
has become a widely used policy instrviment among third world
and to a lesser extent, industrialized governments. Its
application can take two forms. The first is total nationali¬
zation which involves a "100 percent" control of economic
entities by the public sector. The second application is
2
"partial nationalization." This involves a situation in
which the public sector or the state controls majority owner¬
ship of all existing stocks of an economic entity.
The reasons for the nationalization of private property
have varied from the need to address substantive inequities
to one of personal or ideological preferences. For example,
Forbes Burnham, Guyana's Prime Minister, has never
been known for his militancy or radicalism. In fact,
on occasions, it has been clear that United States
and Brisish interests have helped him win elections
against his Indian and Marxist opponent, Cheddi
Jacan. In September 1970 he paid a sentimental visit
to Africa, touring countries like Zambia and Uganda.
Burnham was impressed with their nationalization of
foreign interests, went back home to Guyana, and under
strong domestic pressure, took a 66 percent stake in
the Demerara bauxite (part of Alcan's empire), which
was the chief extractive industry in the country.
After some abortive negotiations^ this became a full-
scale expropriation of the firm.^
Some of the more substantive reasons for the nationalization
^Henry Higgs, ed., Palgrave Dictionary of Political
Economy, vol. 2 (London: Macmillan and Company, 19 5^
^Julio Faundez and Sol Picciotto, Nationalization of
Multinationals in Peripherial Economies (Homes and Meir Pub¬
lisher, 1972), p. 18.
^Louis Turner, Multinational Companies and the Third
World (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973), p. ^TT!
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of industries are as follows:^
a) To achieve a large share of resource
flows (e.g., profits, foreign exchange).
b) To achieve a greater degree of control over
ongoing decisions (e.g., output and invest¬
ment levels, pricing, citizenisation of posts,
purchase of local input, expansion into export
markets).
c) To maintain or enhance the decision-taking
groups' political base.
d) To facilitate a basic shift in political
economic ideology (e.g., transition to
socialism, to state capitalism, to domestic
capitalist ownership of a broader share of
production mits) .
e) For independence from economic disturbance
abroad and autonomy over the host countries
own national industrial development.
In the quest toward these and other objectives, nations have
turned to nationalization. In Latin America and other parts
of the developing world, nationalization has affected all
industries, ranging from copper, grain-milling, transport,
domestic marketing of essential products, external trade,
financial system, bauxite, alviminum and petroleiim. In
Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Colxjmbia,
Brazil,and Venezula their governments have created
state enterprises with greater or less control over
the petroleum or oil industry.^
According to a state department study,
... thirty-four coimtries in Latin America, Asia and
Africa have resorted to a variety of measures designed
^Faundez and Piccioto, The Nationalization of Multi¬
nationals in Peripherial Economies, p. 23 and Patric M.
Boarman and Hans Schollhammer, eds., Multinational Corpora¬
tions and Governments.
^Louis Turner, Multinatiohal Companies and the Third
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to take over or force out U.S.-controlled operations
in their territory with value of $1.2 billion.i
However, "Since 1971 expropriation and nationalization
have declined sharply, as" developing nations have turned to
new tactics "to protect their fragile economies from inter-
O
national combines." To do so they have
1. Diligently screened new investments and in
many cases insisted upon joint ventures.
2. Insisted that foreigners make a "fair return"
on capital and take only equitable profits.
3. Restrict foreign nationals from comprising more
than 5 percent of any job category, and train
nationals to asstime the most important jobs in
the enterprise.
One of the primary reasons for these and other new
restrictive measures of the host country is the inefficiency
and failure of totally nationalized industries. For example,
Guyana, after "the full-scale expropriation of the Demerara
bauxite firms," is "faced with the problems of finding somebody
3
to run the firm and to buy its output."
Bauxite/alumina and Nationalization
in Jamaica
The Jamaican government in 1974 nationalized the
bauxite/altimina industry. The major points of the agreements
World (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973), p. 76.
•^Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, Global Reach:
The Power of the Multinational Corporations (New York: Simpson
and Schuster, 197 ) , p. 5^"!
^"Business Week," The Nationalist Barriers go Higher
(New York and New Jersey: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 1267
3
Op Cit., Louis Turner, p. 94 and The Economist,
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1. Government will own all mining land.
2. The government may purchase a share of any
alumina processing plant.
3. The government will own 51 percent of the
bauxite-mining operations.
4. The government pays "written-down book value,"
not "market price," for any land or equity
it buys from the companies.
5. The companies are guaranteed 40 years supply
of bauxite.
However, in the quest to take control of the industry,
the Jamaican government had two options; either to totally
nationalize or partially nationalize. After taking the power
of the aluminum companies into account Jamaica chose to par¬
tially nationalize.^ In Guyana, where the government made
another choice, marketing and management difficulties had
followed.
For Jamaica, the partial nationalization route was
seen by the government as a cautious alternative
that would not disrupt the Jamaican economv and lead
to some of the problems Guyana had faced.^
The reasons for the nationalization were primarily
because the government and the bauxite companies had reached
an impasse on an agreed tax rate and thus the government
imposed a tax and royalty law. Secondly, the government
wanted to raise state revenues and increase the Jamaican share
^Op. Cit., Sharman Welds, pp. 8-15.
^Op. Cit., Sherry Keith and Robert Girling, p. 24.
^Ibid., p. 59.
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of the baxixite profit.^ As a result, the levy brought the
government's earnings from baxoxite and alumina from U.S. $23
million in 1974 to U.S. $195 million in 1978. However, output
fell from 15 million tons of ba^axite mine in 1974 to 11.6
million tons in 1978. Currently, American and Canadian bauxite
firms are trying to reach a new tax agreement, which would lower
the controversial production levy unilaterally imposed by the
government.^ In turn the government is hoping that this incen¬
tive will allow the companies to once again expand their pro¬
duction.
In chapter one of this study, an investigation will be
made into the aggregate income generating capacity of the
bauxite industry. In addition, an analysis will be made of
the linkage effect of the industry on the domestic economy. In
chapter two an investigation will be made into the effect or
impact of nationalization. This will entail to some degree
looking at the change in income, production, and to what extent
has the linkage effect of the industry in relationship to the
domestic economy, changed. Finally, a summary and conclusion
will be drawn and made respectively.
^"The Economist," Europeans Wanted (London: The
Economist Newspaper Limited, December 1979), p. 84.
^Ibid., p. 84.
CHAPTER I
BAUXITE AND THE ECONOMY BEFORE NATIONALIZATION
The basic characteristic of the Jamaican economy is its
high composition of foreign trade. In fact, the total of ex¬
port and import occupy a disproportionately large share of the
economy. Exports, as late as 1945, were exclusively agricul¬
tural, consisting of semi-processed sugar, bananas, together
with crops of lesser economic significance such as citrus, cof¬
fee, cocoa and pimento.
Export composition is subject to the adverse movement
in the terms of trade between primary producing and manufac¬
turing countries. From a historical perspective, the price of
primary products, including sugar and bananas, tends to be un¬
stable, showing no general tendency to rise through time. On
the contrary, the price for manufactured commodities tends to
be stable with a general upward trend.^ Consequently, as gene¬
rations passed, it took larger increments of primary products
to acquire a given quantity of manufactured goods.
In its quest to reverse this trend, Jamaica, like all
other island nations, invited multinational corporations into
the country from which foreign exchange could be generated to
^Michael Manley, The Politics of Change (Kingston,
Jamaica: Andre' Deutch, 19/4), p. iu2.
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finance import consumption goods. However, the entry of the
international firms had a pervasive influence upon the local
economy. These firms engaged in the production of staple
commodity exports; in new export activities, such as tourism;
in sectors linked to foreign trade such as banking and finance;
and even in some of the more important import substituting
activities. In such a situation, the local island economy can
scarcely be described as self-sufficient. It might more prop¬
erly be regarded as part of an overseas economy, since most
economic decisions are in the hands of non-nationals.
Nevertheless, the discovery, subsequent mining, and
semi-processing of bauxite in Jamaica, has resulted in far
reaching changes in the Jamaican economy. Changes which, in
the words of one 1952 Jamaican economist, are analogous to
that of railroad-building on the American economy in the 1850s.^
The primary objective of this chapter is to analyse
the impact of the bauxite industry on the Jamaican economy. In
this respect topics of investigation include:
1. An analysis of the aggregate income generating
capacity of the bauxite industry
2. Investigation into the low local share of
income generated by the bauxite industry
3. An analysis of the affect of the bauxite
industry on
a) Labour and employment
b) Baxaxite land ownership and agriculture
c) Manufacturing
4. Ba\axite and class structure
^Hansford W. Palmer, The Jamaican Economy (New York:
Praeger, 1968), p. 15.
3I.The Domestic Aggregate Income Generating Capacity
of the Bauxite Industry Within the
Jamaican Economy
One of the direct impacts of the bauxite industry upon
the Jamaican economy, inter alia, is the creation of income.
This income can be classified into four separate categories:
1. Money spent on materials and supplies purchased
by the bauxite industry from domestic firms
2. Wages and salaries
3. Taxes paid to the government
4. Money spent on capital goods purchased from
domestic firms.
The data are made explicit on table 1.1.
Table 1.2 represents four sets of data. The first column
shows the gross domestic product arising in the industry as a
proportion of total gross domestic product. The gross domestic
product (G.D.P.) of bauxite excludes intermediate purchases by
the industry from the national economy but includes deprecia¬
tion and net profit in the industry, which accrues abroad. As
a measure of bauxite 's contribution to national income, it
therefore has its limitations. The second colvunn shows the
growth (7o change from year to year) of the bauxite G.D.P. as a
percentage of total G.D.P. Column three shows the local pay¬
ments of the industry as a proportion of gross national product.
This includes all purchases and payments by the industry to the
national economy, and excludes its foreign payments such as im¬
ports, depreciation and net profit. It is therefore a more
accurate index of the direct income contribution of the industry.
Column four shows the growth (% change from year to year) of the
bauxite local payments as a percentage of G.N.P. An examination
of table 1.1 and 1.2 will show some notable features.
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TABLE 1,1
LOCAL PAYMENTS BY THE BAUXITE COMPANIES (J’OOO)
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 COLUMN 5
’000 *000 J31 J?1 ’000
YEAR MATERIALS WAGES TAXES TOTAL CAPITAL
& & &
SUPPLIES SALARIES ROYALTIES
1953 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 8,374.59
1954 3,074.67 4,426.57 311,534 7,812,774.0 2,392.74
1955 9,969.75 6,057.62 770,890 16,798,260.0 4,758.48
1956 N.A. 6,703.66 1,580,007 N.A. N.A.
1957 N.A. 8,546.07 7,349,945 N.A. N.A.
1958 5,583.06 10,252.89 8,426,114 24,262,064.0 12,892.88
1959 5,447.47 8,924.92 7,107,059 16,031,979.0 4,889.17
1960 6,922.99 11,792.22 10,632,901 29,348,111.0 3,002.88
1961 8,183.17 13,319.59 13,137,560 34,640,320.0 3,170.38
1962 7,716.58 15,508.94 12,693,431 35,918,951.0 7,764.44
1963 7,696.65 15,138.07 12,251,195 35.085,915.0 14,735.29
1964 10,320.68 16,948.58 14,660,602 41,929,862.0 9,872.11
1965 11,879.95 18,595.58 15,784,887 46,260,417.0 8.865.10
1966 9,770.36 22,025.17 19,670,001 51,465,531.0 23,261.42
1967 15,732.21 28,756.75 17,353,210 61,842,170.0 26,894.40
1968 19,464.0 13,966.0 20,276,094 53,706,094.0 33,600.0
1969 34,644.0 19,874.0 24,581,768 79,099,768.0 46,538.0
1970 38,309.0 22,918.0 29,957,721 91,184,721.0 45,063.0
1971 8,193.0 28,716.0 25,119,810 62,028,810.0 53,014.0
1972 11,465.0 33,712.0 22,113,161 67,290,161.0 22,986.0
Sources: Column 1 - 1958-1972 Economic Survey, Central Planning Unit,
Jamaica Annual Chapter on Mining.
1956: Government of Jamaica - National Plan for
Jamaica; 1957-1972 includes local capital expenditure
in that year. 1954 - 95 percent of payments by the
Mining and Quarrying sector to transport distribution
and service sectors as given by C. O'Loughlin, "Long-
Term Growth of the Economy of Jamaica," Social and
Economic Studies, vol. 12, no. 3
Column 1 - 1954-1963: Department of Statistics, National Accounts
1964-1963: Economic Survey. Includes wages and salaries
in agricultural and construction operations.
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Column 3 - Interpolated from payments in each financial year as
given in A National Plan for Jamaica, and Economic
Survey, Annual.
Column 5 - 1953-1955; A National Plan for Jamaica.
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% ' From Year
to Year
1953 2.3 2.9
1954 3.8 65.2 2.0 -31.0
1955 4.6 21.0 2.8 40.0
1956 5.1 10.9 2.7 -3.6
1957 8.4 64.7 5.1 88.9
1958 8.3 -1.2 5.7 11.8
1959 7.5 -9.6 4.3 -24.6
1960 9.1 21.3 5.0 16.3
1961 9.0 -1.1 4.8 -4.2
1962 9.1 1.1 5.8 20.8
1963 8.3 -8.8 5.7 ;.1.72
1964 8.8 6.2 5.2 -8.8
1965 8.9 1.1 5.6 7.7
1966 8.6 -3.4 6.5 16.1
1967 13.2 53.5 10.3 58.5
1968 11.8 -10.6 9.1 -11.7
1969 13.5 14.4 11.5 26.4
1970 15.6 15.5 10.1 -12.2
1971 15.8 1.3 8.1 -19.8
Source: From data in Jamaica National Accounts, Department of Statistics
(1953-1971).
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Although the G.D.P. contribution of the industry rose
and fluctuates between 2.3 to 15.8 percent, its actual local
payments as a proportion of the G.N.P. fluctuates between 2.9
to 11.5 percent. The largest percentage increase of bauxite
G.D.P. of the total national G.D.P. occurred between 1953-1954
and 1956-1957. In terms of G.N.P., the largest percentage in¬
crease occurred between 1954-1955 and 1956-1957. Secondly, the
local payments of the industry are significantly less than its
total contribution to output, as reflected by the percentage
change in column two, and four of table 1.2 over the years.
Other feature worthy of comment are the wide year to year fluc¬
tuation in capital expenditure (to be discussed under separate
heading); and the fact that, even though materials and supplies,
and taxes and royalties are '>i7ortant contributors to local
payments, taxes and royalties are the largest single item of local
pa3niients.
Bauxite and State Revenue
Because the bauxite industry was totally owned by inves¬
tors from abroad, its main contributions to the Jamaican economy
is in the form of royalties ana taxes. A large contribution did
not take place until 1957/1958, when a new tax agreement was
negotiated. This agreement increased tax revenue per ton of
bauxite substantially. Table 1.3 shows that this change, which
raised tax payments as a proportion of total payments to increase
from four to seven percent to between thirty-three and fifty-two
percent. This action also raised such payments as a proportion
7
TABLE 1.3









1952 n.a. 1952/53 0.1
1954 4 1953/54 0.4
1955 n.a. 1954/55 0.6
1956 7 1955/56 1.6
1957 n.a. 1956/57 1.8
1958 39 1957/58 11.1
1959 46 1958/59 15.3
1960 52 1959/60 11.9
1961 47 1960/61 10.5
1962 47 1961/62 16.4
1963 39 1962/63 17.7
1964 42 1963/64 13.2
1965 45 1964/65 13.2
1966 37 1965/66 15.2
1967 33 1966/67 13.8
1968 n.a. 1967/68 14.6
Source: Jamaica Bauxite Institute, vol. I (1979):36.
of government general revenue from 1.8 percent to between 11
and 14 percent.
As a result of the 1957 agreement and the growth of
output, the industry became the largest single taxpayer in the
economy. By 1968, the government derived about 14 percent of
its tax revenues from the bauxite/altjmina industry. This reve¬
nue, however, was relatively small by comparison with the value
which the industry was generating for the company themselves.
But vertical integration, i.e., the undertaking by a single
firm of successive stages in the process of production of a
particular good, of the bauxite/altimina industry made it diffi¬
cult for Jamaica to increase its share of the profit for several
reasons:
8
1. It was not easy to establish a market price for
bauxite ore upon which to base taxation. This
is because each company owned all stages of produc¬
tion, mining, refining and smelting. Hence the
product never was offered on the market; rather
it was "sold" by subsidiary to parent company for
a "transfer price."
2. The companies consistently undervalued the price
of the Jamaican ore, which kept down their tax
payment to the government,
When the Jamaican government discovered how the companies
were undervaluing the price, a new agreement was negotiated set¬
ting tax at about $1.85 per ton. This agreement remained in
effect until 1971 when the rate was raised to $2.40 per ton-
still extremely low considering that smelted alxmainxom ingot were
selling for approximately $500 per ton in the United States.^-
Nevertheless, this substantial revenue which the Jamai¬
can government collected resulting from the 1957 agreement,
enabled the government to finance enormous levels of govern¬
ment expenditures under the Ten Year Development Program.
Local Capital Expenditure
Between the years 1950 and 1960 the ba\axite industry
accounted for forty-nine million pounds of total gross fixed
investment. Out of this total, the amount invested in Jamaica
(the local content) was twenty-five million, just over 50 percent.
Because capital goods equipment and machinery had to be imported
from abroad for the mining and benification process, the effect
of capital expenditure on local income was reduced drastically.
A large part of local capital expenditure is paid out to
^See "A Brief History of the Bauxite/Alxjmina Industry
in Jamaica," in JBI Digest, vol. 1, no. 3 (September 1976).
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contractors who themselves have employed imported machinery
and equipment. The real domestic content of capital expen¬
diture consists of wages paid to construction workers, pur¬
chases of cement and building blocks, and the local value added
on such items as locally assembled fixtures and capital goods
imported through Jamaican intermediaries.
Another aspect of local capital spending by the com¬
panies is the variation from year to year and period to period,
coinciding with the initiation and completion of major expan¬
sion projects. The primary phases of investment (capital
spending) were as follows:
1. 1950-1958: establishment of initial capital
by Kaiser, Reynolds, and Alcan
2. 1954-1955: lull
3. 1956-1958: expansion of capacity by Kaiser,
Reynolds and Alcan
4. 1959-1962: lull
5. 1963: completion of capacity by Alcoa
6. 1964-1965: lull
7. 1966-1969: expansion of capacity. As can be seen on
table 1.4, the amount of capital expenditure by the bauxite
industry rose from $22,294,000 in 1966 to a high of $46,538,000
in 1969; an increase capital expenditure of over 51 percent.
The capital increase resulted from:
A. The January 1967 beginning construction of a
81.0 million pound alxmiina plant by alumina
partners of Jamaica. This plant had an initial
capacity of 950,000 short tons annually and is
10
TABLE 1,4
SELECTED EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT OF BAUXITE
AND ALUMINA COMPANIES IN JAMAICA: 1966-1970
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Capital Expenditure
($'000) 22,294 25,681 33,600 46,538 45,063
Payments for Goods
and Services ($'000) 17,319 19,248 19,464 34,644 38,309
Wages and Salaries
($'000) 10,536 15,715 13,966 19,874 22,918
Number Employed 5,013 6,053 5,892 10,179 12,039
TABLE 1.5







1971 1972 1971 1972 1973
Land Development 1,307.1 2,489.9 1,307.1 2,489.9 N/A
Buildings and
other construc¬
tion 72,401.4 39,353.4 46,873.8 20,043.2 N/A
Machinery and
Equipment 21,811.3 2,637.3 4,362.2** 216.0 N/A
Others 470.5 989.6 470.5 237.4 N/A
95,990.4 45,470.2 53,013.6** 22,986.0 N/A
^Relates mainly to the local content of installation cost.
**Revised
N/A - Not Available.
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capable of expansion to 1,3 million short tons.
B. The February 1967 agreement signed with Revere
Brass and Copper, Inc. for the construction of
a 660,000 short ton altimina plant with an initial
capacity of 220,000 short tons. Capital invest¬
ment in this plant was well over 52.0 million
pounds.
C. The agreement signed with Alcoa Minerals of
Jamaica, Inc. for the construction of an altimina
plant with a capacity of 800,000 tons annually.
Capital investment amounted to roughly 66.0 mil¬
lion pounds. The plant had an initial capacity
of 200,000 tons.
D. The House of Representatives in Jamaica agreed
unanimously to seek revision of arrangements
with the bauxite companies. The new arrangements
fostered increased production which led to the
building of an alumina plant and fabrication of
altiminxim.
8. 1970-1973: lull, as can be seen on table 1.5, even
though in 1971 the local capital expenditure by the bauxite
industry increased greater than the period of 1966-1969, there
was a lull between 1970-1973. In 1970, local capital expendi-
diture fell from a 1969 high of $46,538,000 to $45,063,000;
by 1972 local capital expenditure hit an all time low
except for 1966 for the period 1966-1972, of $22,986,000. This
rapid decline in capital expenditure is attributable to the
fact that the rapid expansion phase of alumina production capa¬
city which commenced in 1966 came to an end during the early
part of the period. Capital expenditure during 1973-75 was much
lower than that of 1972.^
These sparodic phases of expansion, resulting in a stimulus for
the construction industry, create employment. However, the
effects are temporary. Moreover, these projects were so large
that after their completion, massive unemployment of skilled
workers and spare capacity within the building industry usually
Jamaica Planning Agency,
Statistics (1972), p. 47
Published by Department of
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resulted. A dramatic example of this is provided by the Alpart
Project which constructed a 950,000 ton capacity alumina plant
at Nain, in St. Elizabeth. At the height of construction, over
5,000 workers were employed but upon completion in mid-1969, the
plant provided permanent employment for only 1,000 men.
II. The Low Local Share of Income Generated By
the Bauxite/Alimiina Industry
To investigate the reasons for the low local share of
income generated by the bauxite/alumina industry it's best to
separate the gross output of the baxixite industry into inter¬
mediate purchases and value added for the years 1959 to 1966.
The result can be seen in table 1.6. These two parts of gross
output are related to that sector of the economy which deals
with
1. Mining and drying of bauxite for export
2. Mining, drying and bonification which will
be referred to as "multi-product operation."
As can be seen, the industry's gross output is charac¬
terized by a large share of value added and a low share of
intermediaries. This is even more explicit in the dried bauxite
operation (eighty-four percent value added in gross output) than
for themulti-product operation (sixty-nine percent). The reason
for this is that mining and drying bauxite require a high level
of capital and labour. The only intermediates used of any con¬
sequence are fuel oil, for machinery, and explosives for blast¬
ing. In benefication, more materials are used up per ton of ore:
such as caustic soda, starch cloth, and mineral lime.
TABLE 1.6
SHARE OF INTERMEDIATES AND VALUE ADDED IN GROSS OUTPUT
NATIONAL AND FOREIGN CONTENT












1959-1966 16 84 13 39 52 3 45 48
Multi-Product,
1959-1966 31 69 13 30 43 18 39 57
Both Activities,
1959-1966 24 76 13 34 47 11 42 53
Source: National Income Worksheets. Jamaica Bauxite Institute, 15 Caledonia Road,
Kingston, Jamaica, West Indies.
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The chief influence on the low local share of the
industry is therefore the share of value added which accrues
to national as compared to foreign factors of production.
Since the industry's basic institutional feature is that it is
operated by MNCa, it follows that the capital is foreign-owned.
The primary influence on the local share is, therefore, the
returns to capital as compared to the returns to labour. Other
things being equal, the higher the share of returns to capital
in value added the higher the foreign content of value added.
For while it is the case that a part of the returns to capital
accrues to national factors in the form of tax payments to
national government; this is only a part, whereas the whole or
nearly the whole accrual to labor is earned by national factors
of production.
This is the case in baxixite mining and benification
which is highly capital-intensive. The result is that the share
of wages in value added in the Jamaican industry is low. Table
1.7 shows that the average wage component of value added for
1959-1966 has been fifteen percent for dried baxixite, and
eighteen percent for multi-product. Both operations have
exhibited a slight tendency for the wage component to grow over
time.
Gross profit, which is correspondingly high, is divided
up among taxes, depreciation and net profit. In the case of
the dried bauxite, taxes are fixed per ton of ore exported and
vary only with the price of alumin\jm. The value of the ore for
statistical purposes has been fixed at one level since 1957. The
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stability of per unit taxes in a fixed unit value has resulted
in a relatively stable share of taxes in value added— an
average of thirty-one percent. Thus, the chief components of
the local share in value added for dried bauxite gives rise to
a total which is less than fifty percent in total value added.
In the multi-product operation which includes alumina
production,, more capital is used relative to mining and drying
operations only.
TABLE 1.7
PERCENT SHARE OF WAGES, TAXES, DEPRECIATION AND NET PROFIT
IN VALUE ADDED IN THE BAUXITE INDUSTRY
Wages Taxes Depreciation Net Profit
Dried Bauxite 14.8 31.2 11.1 41.6
1959-1966
Multi-Product
1959-1966 17.6 22.7 23.0 33.4
Source: Jamaica Planning Unit (Composition of 1959-1966 Data).
Table 1.8 shows that for dried bauxite, the bulk of
intermediate inputs are services rather than goods. If, for
example, we asstime that all imported inputs consisted of goods,
the total of all goods inputs (purchases of manufactured goods
plus imports) would still amount to only twenty-two percent of
all intermediates in 1966. Since the mining and drying of
bauxite uses few materials, the bulk of its small intermediate
purchases consists of services such as transportation, public
utility services, construction, etc., and since services are.
16
generally, non-transportable, the intermediates are supplied
principally from domestic sources.
The share of commodity inputs in intermediates for the
multi-product operation is far higher. This is a reflection of
the amount of materials used up in the benification process.
As table 1.8 shows, a majority of these goods inputs are, in
fact, imported. The result is that the national content in
TABLE 1.8
SOURCES OF INPUTS IN INTERMEDIATE PURCHASES,
1959-66. PERCENT
Dried Bauxite Multi-Product






Building Construction 38.5 2.2
Other 2.2
Imported: Total 18.5 51.8
Goods n.a. 51.5
Services n.a. 6.3
Source: Jamaica Planning Unit.
n.a.: Not available.
intermediates in the multi-product operation, where the share
of intermediates in gross output is higher, is only forty-two
percent. In dried bauxite, the national content in intermediates
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is high, but the importance of this is reduced by the fact that
the share of intermediate in gross output is low,
The net result of the low national content of value
added in both operations and the low national content in the
intermediates of the multi-product operation where the share of
the intemediates is higher is a low overall local share.
Because the subsidiaries of the bauxite industry in
Jamaica is fully integrated with North American and other
foreign companies (see appendix I for profile of the MNCs
which control bauxite production in Jamaica); it is separated
from the Jamaican economy in terms of its output, inputs and
the choice of factor production.
In its choice of factor proportions, the firm operates
within the limits of prevailing technology. In alumina pro¬
duction, the chemical process dictates relatively fixed, capi¬
tal-intensive techniques. But there seems to be wide latitude
in the use of labor-intensive or capital-intensive techniques
in bauxite mining, which is essentially an earth-moving activity.
The use of capital-intensive techniques in Jamaica is influenced
by the need to maintain a regular flow of bauxite to aliminvim
plants.
Even where labour-intensive techniques are available,
the price of labour relative to capital may not be such as to
encourage their use. Within the Jamaican economy, labour is
the relatively abundant factor. But the particular type of
skilled labour required by the firm may be in short supply and
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the firm itself may have to bear the cost of training,^ On
the other hand, capital is far more abundant to the firm than
it is to the Jamaican economy. The firm has access to the rich
and highly developed capital market of the United States and
also through its own international-generated savings.
Given the use of capital-intensive techniques, the share
of returns to capital in value added is high, given foreign
capital ownership this share accrued abroad.
Ill. The Impact of the Bauxite Industry on Labour
and Employment, Manufacturing, Bauxite,
Land Ownership and Agriculture
As a result of the high capital/labour ratio within
the bauxite industry, the amount of direct employment provided
forms a very low proportion of the labour force, and the amount
of wages paid out, a very low percentage of total wages paid
out in the Jamaican economy.
The total level of employment provided by the industry
did not experience significant secular growth between 1958 and
1966 as shown in table 1.9. Total employment provided is
divided into "mining and related" activities, which includes
the companies' agricultural operations, and emplo5niient in own-
account construction, which varies with the amount of activity
going on in the expansion of capacity. The effect of a rise
in employment in "mining and related" activities was eliminated,
during this period, by the steep fall in employment in own-
^For example, Alpart has trained hundreds of workers
for its plant in St. Elizabeth.
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account construction consequent on the termination of the
companies' large expansion programmes in the middle 1950s.
In 1960 the industry employed roughly 0.5 percent of
the country's work force. But at the same time it did not serve
as a direct source to increase employment on an economy which
was suffering from chronic employment opportunities. According
to government census, the amount of unemployed in Jamaica was
82,000 persons, some thirteen percent of the labour force. Net
additions to the labour force were estimated by the government
TABLE 1.9






1958 4,700 2600 2100
1959 3,800 3100 700
1960 3,100 3000 60
1961 4,659 3000 900
1962 5,444 3300 600
1963 5,762 3600 800
1964 5,006 N/A N/A
1965 6,246 N/A N/A
1966 6,013 N/A N/A
1967 7,308 N/A N/A
1968 5,710 N/A N/A
1969 9,971 N/A N/A
1970 13,390 N/A N/A
1971 11,629 N/A N/A
1972 9,719 N/A N/A
Source: Economic Survey, Annual Reports 1958-1971.
20
to run at an annual average of over 20,000 persons in the
1960-1970 decade. Thus, the total employment provided by the
industry tends to decrease both relatively and absolutely
with increasing growth of the labour force.
The evidence is that the industry creates far more
emplo3mient outside of the national economy, in the benefication
process of the ore, than within it. In 1969 an estimate based
on the labour/output ratios in the Jamaican industry and in
the United States smelting industry, reveals that the employ¬
ment content of export was approximately 13,000 full-time jobs
in benefication, and 50,000 full-time in smelting. This, how¬
ever, excludes the employment created in semi-fabricating, and
in the production of inputs for these processes, and the in¬
direct emplo3mient created out of the expenditure from the
labour income.
As can be seen in table 1.10, the total amount of wages
paid out by the industry is a small proportion of total wages
paid in Jamaica. This proportion has been rising, but slowly,
from around two to approximately five percent. These negligible
increases have resulted from workers militancy and the unioni¬
zation of the industry. In 1952, the bauxite workers earned
one shilling and two pence an hour, adding up to less than a
dismal income which an average family would need to buy the
necessities of life, with a small margin over for the family’s
comforts. Low wage rate such as those led the national workers
union to demand one dollar (12 shilling) an hour. Moreover,
there is evidence that the growth of wages has not kept pace
21
TABLE 1.10
TOTAL WAGES AND SALARIES PAID BY THE BAUXITE-






















Source: National Accounts, Department of Statistics,
Jamaica, and Economic Survey 1967. Central
Planning Unit, Jamaica, 1970.
with the growth of physical output in the industry. Thus,
between 1953-1964, the wage bill grew by two hundred and
forty-one percent. The volume of bauxite output grew by two
hundred and forty-one percent in the said period, but that of
alumina output had grown over four hundred percent.
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Manufac turing
The data in table 1.8 showed that purchases by the
industry from manufacturing are insignificant. Such purchases
in turn form an infinitestimal proportion of the total sales
of manufacturing. As discussed earlier on the mining of
bauxite used few material. However, the benefication of bauxite
ore into alxmiina uses susbtantial amount of goods, the bulk of
which are imported.
The primary goods used in the benefication process are
steam, fuel oil and caustic soda, all of which represents 75
percent of the total material costs other than the cost of
bauxite. Out of this 75 percent, 40 percent alone being the
costs of caustic soda. The actual imports of caustic soda to
Jamaica grew steadily from 1950 to a 1965 level of over 61,000
tons, reflecting the expanding needs of alumina production. The
cost of these imports varied because of the violent price fluc¬
tuations, but the annual import bill, in the 1960s, was of the
order of 1 million pounds per year. This constituted a signifi¬
cant leakage from the local income stream.
The other main inputs in the benefication process are
fuel oil and steam. The former was imported until 1963 when a
local oil refinery was set up. The value added on imported
crude, however, was relatively low. Steam was produced by
Alcan itself from a plant adjacent to the alumina works. One
interesting possibility lies in the use of flour produced from
the Jamaican bread-fruit tree, a replacement for starch in the
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benefication process. A patent for this material was applied
for by a JamaicaSx, but it is not known if the alumina producers
have shown any interest in the possibility.
Ba-uxite Land Ownership and Agriculture
The beginning of the 1970s saw approximately 211,000
acres of bauxite lands owned by Alcan, Alcoa, Alpart, Kaiser,
Revere and Reynolds. These covered the major areas over which
Jamaica's bauxite reserves are distributed. This major owner¬
ship of bauxite land under private control was made readily
available by laws which says that mineral rights in Jamaica,
except for petrolexjm resources, belonged to the owners of the
surface.^ Consequently, the bauxite industry took advantage of
the law and purchased tens of thousands of bauxite land in its
early stage.
The acquisition of bauxite lands by the companies had
gone unchecked for more than two decades, with strong competi¬
tion between the companies to control as much land as possible.
Except for Kaiser to a certain extent, the big three
(Alcan, Reynolds and Kaiser) had consolidated adequate reserves
to allow them to carry on their mining operations without much
concern for resettlement programs. Transactions were completed
on the basis of outright purchases, some form of resettlement
or outright purchase, and lease-back arrangement until the
lands were required for mining.
1
See "The Regulatory Structure, Past and Present," by
]iJ. Gillett Chambers, Chief Land Branch, Jamaica Bavixite Institute,
15 Caledonia Road, Jamaica, West Indies.
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The government put no constraints on the ability of
foreign companies to acquire land in Jamaica, Indeed it re¬
quired the holders of a mining lease to uwn surface rights but
it did try to regulate the use of such lands through the
baxixite and aliimina industries encouragement law (1950) , In
effect, this law required that some level of agriculture pro¬
duction be maintained on lands owned by the companies. This
decision was based on the rationale that these lands were best
suited for cattle, that the island needed an increase in both
beef and dairy production, and that, of all the types of farm¬
ing, cattle raising could most easily be coordinated with a
mining programme.
However, today there are still substantial reserves
which are controlled by small farmers and other bauxite land
which are being occupied by roads, village and towns.
Thus, part of the legacy that Jamaica has inherited
after more than twenty years of bauxite mining operations in
the island include: (a) pressure from the baxixite companies
for the consolidation of lands for mining; (b) pressures from
settlers needing lands for farming; and (c) pressures from
growing townships which occupy more reserve.
Landlords who refused to sell their properties are
called "hold-outs." Several surveys carried out by the Jamaica
Bavixite Institute indicate that their main reasons for refusing
to sell their lands are:^
^See Jamaica Bauxite Institute Digest, vol. 5, no. 1
(1978).
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(a) Price: No agreed price can be arrived at between
the company and vendor
(b) Legal Land Docxments: Lack of any proof of legal
ownership makes bona fide transaction difficult
(c) Sentimental Attachment to the Land: This is par¬
ticularly true among the more elderly
(d) Land Legacies: Where properties are to be divided
among children, according to wills.
(e) Distrust of the company with regards to settle¬
ment terms and conditions
(f) Refusal to be relocated any great distance from
their chidlren
Apart from the problem created by hold-outs, the other
main reason for creating difficulties in consolidating small
holding areas for mining are:
(a) Subdivision of lands and construction of buildings
on bauxite lands, resulting in further fragmenta¬
tion
(b) Uncontrolled growth in townships and villages in
bauxite areas
(c) Absentee ownership of lands
(d) Past history of the resettlement of individuals
and not communities, with resulting complaints
about land suitability, social amenities and
location.
Agriculture
The process in the industry do not involve the purchase
of agricultural inputs, but the companies have had to undertake
farming operations. This followed from their legal obliga¬
tions to maintain the land acquired by them in at least the
preexisting state of agricultural productivity, and to restore
mined-out areas to their previous state of agricultural pro¬
ductivity. In 1957, a ministry paper published by the
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government showed that the companies had improved the produc¬
tivity of the land occupied by them, and were engaged in the
expansion of the beef, pork and poultry production.^- It is
certainly the case that the companies have been responsible for
a significant expansion of the beef herd in the island.
The data do not, however, permit a detailed assessment
of the agricultural operations of the companies over the whole
period. Since 1957, substantial acreages have been acquired
by the companies, and virtually no information as to their
utilization is available. Much of the land purchased by the
companies previously belonged to large landowners who had
engaged in large cattle rearing, with low cattle/land ratios
and unimproved pasture. Moreover, since the land is held for
its bauxite deposits, a portion of it must always be held for
mining, and long-term improvement on the portion that would
not be feasible.
As the rate of production increased, so would the area
earmarked for mining in the near future by each company. Fin¬
ally, since the principal of the companies has nothing to do
with the maximization of the potential of the land, their farm¬
ing operations are carried out in reality to meet government
regulations, and for public relations purposes. Its difficult,
therefore, without firm supporting evidence, to make the as-
stmiption that production from this land is being maximized,
even given the constraint imposed by the need to reserve a
^Government of Jamaica, ’’Ministry Paper No, 20" (July 2,
1957), published by the Agricultural Society.
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part of the land, at any given time, for mining proper. (In
1953, it was reported that twelve percent only of aluminum
ltd's holding of 300,000 acres contained bauxite and only ten
percent of Reynolds 50,000 acres.)
IV. Batixite and Class Structure
As the bauxite industry became more established in the
Jamaican economy, the industry's presence caused important
changes in the labour force. Most decisive were the strangu¬
lation of small peasant agriculture, and the growth of the
industrial proletariat.
The Jamaican peasantry had long been plagued by land
hunger, lack of capital to implement modern farming, and the
general conditions of poverty which besiege the countryside
in most areas of the Caribbean and Latin America. With the
entry of the bauxite companies into the island, the situation
of the peasantry deteriorated.- The acute land shortage was
further aggravated by the more than 211,000 acres of land pur¬
chased by the companies in their competitive bid to secure
bauxite reserves for the future. Some of this land was pur¬
chased from small farmers, who in turn used the cash to leave
the countryside and migrate to the cities. Between 1945 and
1968 the total acreage under cultivation in Jamaica dropped by
18 percent.^
^See George Beckford, "Plantations, Peasants and
Proletariat in the West Indies," in Socialism! Kingston,
Jamaica, vol. 1, no. 3 (September 1974).
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The bauxite industry had several other important
affects on the peasantry. Because the industry was located
in the rural areas and required a skilled though small labour
force, it created a new relatively well paid strata of indus¬
trial workers in the countryside, not to mention the highly
paid technical and administrative staff, who were mainly
foreigners in the industry's early years. The presence of
these groups had a strong inflationary impact on life in the
rural areas adjacent to the bauxite enclaves, driving up the
cost of food, housing and other services. This increase in the
rural cost of living accelerated the migration of the peasantry
to the cities in search of work.
The impact of bauxite in the rural areas not only
affected small scale peasant agriculture, but also affected
the sugar industry. By driving up wages in the countryside foi
both skilled and unskilled labour, workers were drawn away from
sugar to bauxite, exacebating the labour shortage in the sugar
industry, and accelerating the industry's decline.
The bauxite industry created relatively few jobs be¬
cause of its capital intensive nature. With all of the mining
done in open pits, the industry relies more on heavy machinery
than on labour power. Hence, most bauxite workers are machine
operators rather than pick and shovel miners, and are respon¬
sible for running the trucks, cranes and giant earth moving
equipment. The $300 million the company invested in Jamaica
between 1950 and 1976 created only about 6,000 new permanent
jobs, and in 1976 emplo3mient in the industry stool at
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6,000 people (only 0.6 percent of the labour force. (See table
l.ll.)
However, the limited industrialization that accompanied
the inflow of bauxite investment did spearhead the growth of
the industrial proletariat. At the same time, the surplus of
unemployed labour expanded rapidly, with unemployment hovering
above 20 percent almost continuously.
The growth of such a large labour surplus, perpetuated
a low wage structure, and undermined the social and political
TABLE 1.11
BAUXITE IN THE JAMAICAN ECONOMY-1976
Absolute 7o
Employment
Employed labour force 883,600 100
Employed in the bauxite
industry 6,000 0.6
Unemployed labour force 216,400 24
Gross Domestic Product (U.S .$ millions)
All Industries 3,045 100
Baiixite industry 256 8
Foreign Exchange Earnings (U.S. $ millions)
Total 927 100
Baxixite and alumina 428 46




industry through taxes 133 20
Sources: Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 1976. National
Planning Agency, Government of Jamaica, National
Income and Product 1976, Department of Statistics,
Government of Jamaica.
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stability which the bauxite companies encountered and relished
during the early years of the industry. In recent years, an
increasing proportion of urban population has been pushed
into a swelling lumpen proletariat. Hence, the spread of
criminal activities like drug traffic, gambling, robbery and
also political thuggery has been a rising barometer of the
hostility and frustration bottled up among the urban slim dwel¬
lers who find it difficult to secure regular emplo3mient.
In its quest to secure badly needed cash to reduce the
harshness of these social problems, the government of Jamaica
took several important steps vis-a-vis the bauxite industry in
1974. First, it began negotiations with the companies to take
over majority ownership; second, it imposed a substantial levy
on bauxite exports; and third, it took a leading role in the
formation of the International Bauxite Association. In making
these moves, the Manley government also became a symbol of third
world aspiration to assert greater control over their natural
resources and change the dominance of the transnational corpora¬
tions .
Sxjmmary
On the bases of the evidence presented, the contribution
of the bauxite/alvimina industry to Jamaica's economy has been
considerable. But this contribution has been attended by
severe limitations. The share of the economy in the value of
the industry's output is low. Few purchases are made from non¬
bauxite industries and the primary forms of local income
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creation are labour income, taxes and royalties. Little direct
employment is created, and taxes, though large in relation to
total government revenue, remains a complex question not
entirely mastered by the government.
CHAPTER II
THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE BAUXITE MINING
INDUSTRY AND ITS IMPACT ON
THE JAMAICAN ECONOMY
The Jamaican government took several important steps
vis-a-vis the bauxite industry in 1974. First, it sent a
shock wave through the North American aluminum industry by
breaking off renegotiations on bauxite-mining contracts on
May 15, 1974 and proposing a stiff tax and royalty law.^
Secondly, it took a leading role in the formation of an inter¬
national bauxite association, an OPEC-styled producers' organi¬
zation. Thirdly, it began negotiations with the companies to
take over majority ownership of all mining operations. The main
objectives of these moves, which were supported by the Jamaican
bourgeoisie, were to raise state revenues and increase the
Jamaican share of the bauxite profit. In making these moves,
the government, headed by Michael Manley, also became a symbol
of third world aspirations to assert greater control over their
natural resources.
In this chapter, I shall examine the conditions which
influence the Jamaican government's action of nationalization,
the impact of the baxaxite levy and the support lent to it by
^The Economist (March 29, 1974), vol. 251, p. 40.
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the formation of the international bauxite association.
In addition, the joint-venture agreements will be made
explicit and a study of such agreements will be analyzed fully.
Moreover, a detailed exemplication of the impact of the agree¬
ments on land utilization, government revenue, employment in the
bauxite industry, bauxite and alumin\jm production will be laid
bare.
Influencing Factors-Action of Nationalization
Several factors came together which pushed the Manley
government and the national industrialists to move against the
bauxite companies. First was the precarious situation of the
Jamaican economy. By late 1973, it was clear that the economic
revitalization which the People's National Party of Jamaica's
supporters had expected after the national election was not
occurring. Manley had initiated a series of ad hoc reforms dur¬
ing the first two years in office - nationalization of the foreign-
owned electric power, telephone and bus companies and enactment
of a limited, piecemeal land reform program. But these actions,
while attacking some of the symptoms of the prevailing maladies,
did not get to the root of the profound problems which faced the
country.
Jamaica had become increasingly dependent on foreign
capital, both as an investment and a loan source. The relatively
weak capitalists relied more and more on the state to raise invest¬
ment funds for its own purposes, usually through loans obtained
from international agencies such as the World Bank, the
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International Monetary Fund, the Inter-^American Bank, and the
U. S. Agency for International Development, These loans were
often channeled to local capitalists through state lending
agencies such as the Jamaica Development Bank, While benefit¬
ing the Jamaican bourgeoisie, these loans created a serious
weakness in the economy by increasing the country's external
dependency, and adding to the mounting foreign debts.
Moreover, development in the international economy
heightened the fiscal crisis of the Jamaican state. Chief
among these was the international economic crisis and world
wide inflation, which inflicted a heavy burden on all producers
of raw materials. Jamaica's balance of pa3nnents situation took
a turn for the worst with the 1973 oil crisis, which more than
tripled the country's oil import bill from $55 million to
nearly $188 million per year. Like other commodity producers,
Jamaica's export earnings did not grow in pace with the sky¬
rocketing oil bill and the rising cost of manufactured goods
from the industrialized countries.
While all social classes in Jamaica were affected by the
situation, it was the dominant class which was able to act to
protect its interests. The local capitalist was especially
hard hit by the foreign exchange squeeze, since they depended
heavily on imports used in industry and retailing, as well as
for their personal consxamption. If an additional $135 million
would have to be paid in oil, it would mean $135 million less
for electric appliances, cars and gasoline, and shopping trips
to foreign lands.
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It was in large part pressure from the more dynamic and
astute sectors of the bourgeoisie which mobilized the state to
move against the bauxite companies. They saw the bauxite levy
as a way to capture a large part of the companies' profits to
finance their import bill and to enlarge the state budget. Not
only would this revenue be used to underwrite projects to directly
benefit business, but it would also finance government programs
to buy off the unrest and growing militancy among peasants,
workers and the unemployed. While the capitalists quietly
maneuvered the government to ensure their own interest, Manley
also received backing from other sectors-the radical intelligent¬
sia, the trade unions, dispossessed peasants and the unemployed,
all of whom rallied around the banner of nationalism as the
Peoples' National Party moved against the alimainum companies.
The Bauxite Levy
In January of 197A, the government of Jamaica announced
it would renegotiate the tax agreements with the bauxite com¬
panies. Not surprisingly, the negotiating team was composed of
several of Jamaica's most prominent capitalists-once Mayor Matalon,
P.E.H. Rousseau and Douglas Fletcher, former Ambassador to the
United States.
Until 1974, the value of bauxite had been determined by
negotiations between the government and the companies. The
altmiinimi business is integrated from bauxite through the fabri¬
cation; the firms fix their own transfer prices to suit their
individual tax liabilities (for example, only Alcan paid signifi¬
cant amounts of corporation tax in Jamaica). There is no free
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market to speak of in the intermediate alumina stage; the price
of metal on the small free market is too volatile, and the fab¬
ricated products are too varied. Hitherto the companies have
refused to reveal publicly a produder price.^ Hence no market
price. Because of their leverage vis-a-vis the government, the
companies were able to secure low rates of taxation in negotiat¬
ing sessions with the government. According to the latest round
in 1967, taxation was based on a price of $7.50 while the com¬
panies reported a value of $15.00 per ton of bauxite to the
United States custom authorities.
In mid 1974, Jamaica announced the abrogation of previous
agreements and the imposition of a novel method of taxation-a
"production levy" on all bauxite either exported or processed in
Jamaica. This "production levy" is an example of what economist
generally called "indexation," that is setting the price of
bauxite as a fixed percentage of the price of the final product,
ingot. The levy was set at 7.5 percent of the selling price of
alvunintjm ingot, instead of the previous method of comnutin^ the
tax based on an artificail profit negotiated between the govern¬
ment and the companies. As a result, the tax rate increased
480 percent between 1973 and 1975, from $2.50 to $14.51 per ton.
This production levy means that the bauxite companies now pay
more money to the government. At about the same time of the
production levy, the government began negotiations with the
bavixite companies to take over majority ownership of their mining
operations.
This move was accompanied by a paralled well-orchestrated
^The Economist (May 25, 1974), vol. 252, p. 116.
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plan on the international level: steps to form the interna¬
tional bataxite association (IBA) , to present a common gront
to the transnationals. In March 1974, the major bauxite pro¬
ducers met in Conakry, Guinea, to discuss formation of the IBA.
Present were Jamaica, Guyana, Surinam, Guinea, Yugoslavia,
Australia, Sierra Leone and Ghana. From this meeting, Jamaica
emerged as the leading force in the IBA because, as Jamaican
eocnomist, Norman Girvan explained: Alone among the bauxite
exporting nations, Jamaica had both the motivation to seek
higher returns and the leverage to secure them, even over the
opposition of the companies."^
The IBA Takes Shape
The IBA formally came into existence on July 29, 1975,
with headquarters in Jamaica. As part of its overall goal of
safeguarding the interest of member countries in relation to
the bauxite industry, the IBA Association outlined several main
objectives, including,^
1. To negotiate with the transnational to secure
a fair return from the bauxite industry; and
2. To promote the orderly and rational development
of the bauxite industry
The major success of the IBA has been in presenting the
companies with a common front on the question of price. After
three years, the IBA was able to establish a coordinated price
^Norman Girvan, Corporate Imperialism (White Plains,
N. Y. : M.. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1976).
^E. E. Pollard, Producer Association-The Experience of
the International Bauxite Association, International Bauxite
Association (February 1977).
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such that the final delivery price Cincluding transportation
and the levy) for alimina and bauxite for every member country
is equivalent. However, it is also clear that in securing a
larger portion of the profits for member countries, the IBA
does not intend to challenge the rights of the ba^Jxite companies
to privately own and control the industry.
A look at how the IBA affected Jamaica reveals both the
strength and limitation of the producer cartels. One of the
most significant results of the IBA for Jamaica has been the
increase in government revenue resulting from the production
levy.
According to Mr. Henri Guda, the IBA's first secretary,
prior to nationalization the b^xaxite producer countries knew
next to nothing about the industry that supports up to 90 per¬
cent of their governments budgets. Foreign aluminum corpora¬
tion jealously guarded all data on reserves, mining and ship¬
ping costs, and geological and mineralogical properties of
deposits. The companies then exploited the nations ignorance
by paying for like deposits of bauxite price that varied widely
from country to country.^
The job of ending this ignorance was given to Dr. Garnet
Brown, Director of the IBA's Department of Statistical Research
and Technical Information. He led a year-and-a-half long study
of the country's bauxite indudsty. During that study, he had
managed to pry loose a lot of information that the aluminum
^Wall Street Journal (April 23, 1975), p. 1.
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companies had guarded as "priority."
This availability of information to the government has
improved its bargaining position. Prior to 1974 the government
had to rely on company data to estimate the extent of Jamaica's
bauxite reserves, which were generally far below actual amounts.
With the advent of the IBA, joint ownership and the establish¬
ment of the Jamaica Bauxite Institute (which monitors the indus¬
try within Jamaica), the Jamaican government now has access to
independent information on the industry, giving it a new, though
limited, measure of control. The IBA, for example, discovered
that the island's high grade bauxite reserves totaled two (2)
billion tons, not the 600 million tons the companies were claim¬
ing.
It is not surprising that many of the benefits from the
increased bauxite earnings went to Jamaican industrialists. To
handle the additional revenues, the government created the Capi¬
tal Development Fund, whose official purpose was "Building up
and rationalizing the productive capacity of the economy."^
Management of the fund was placed in the hands of a key repre¬
sentative of National Capital, the then Mayor Matalon. The bulk
of the funds $600 million budget has been funneled into con¬
struction industry and to finance companies owned by some of the
very men who were on the bauxite levy negotiating team, and who
now sit on the board of the fund itself.
^Capital Development Fund, Annual Report, 1974.
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The Joint-Venture Bauxite Mining
Operation Agreements
Six North American and French companies (Kaiser, Ana¬
conda, Reynolds, Alcan, Alcoa and a consortium called Alpart)
signed separate joint venture agreements with the government
of Jamaica. These agreements cover the companies' bauxite
mining and altmiina refining operations in Jamaica. These were
the first of a series of agreements which gave Jamaica control
of the country's most valuable resource, bauxite, and thereby
increased her share for its exploitation.
The major points of the agreements are as follows:^
1. The government will own all mining land
2. The government will own 51 percent of all
bauxite mining operation
3. The government may purchase a share of any
al^mlina processing plant
4. The government will pay "written-down book
value," not "market value or price," for
any land or equity it purchases for the
companies.
5. Government nominees will be on the managing
committees of the new joint venture
6. The companies are guaranteed 40 years supply
of bauxite
7. The basic production levy is fixed at 7.5
precent for an 8-year period
8. Suits against Jamaica contesting the levy
before I.C.S.I.D, (The International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes)
will be withdrawn
^Jamaica Foundation, The Baiixite Story (Kingston,
Jamaica, 1978), p. 2.
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In short, the essence of the agreements centres around four
phenomenon:
1. Control of reserves
2. Equity in the operations
3. How Jamaica will pay for her share, and
4. The production levy.
Control of Reserves
Before the nationalization of the bauxite industry,
the baiaxite companies used to own more than 211,600 acres of
land-seven percent of Jamaica’s total land area. A sxmnnary of









(Source: Jamaica Bauxite Institute, Ltd. Annual "Report 1976,
p. 19.)
The government is buying back all but 15,000 acres
which contains the plants and buildings, roads, railroads and
ports; that is, land which is integral to the mining and proces¬
sing operations. The government will, therefore, control all
ore reserves, blocs of which will be leased back to the
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companies for mining as needed.
National control is of more than psychological value to
Jamaica. It facilitates the most orderly and productive use of
ore reserve lands before, during and after mining. This will
be deal with more extensively under a separate topic, entitled
"Optimal Utilization of Bauxite Land-New Policies,"
The new arrangement offers distinct mining' advantages
as well. Each company is guaranteed 40 years' supply of ore
based on existing mining capacity. There is no further need
by an individual company to scramble to acquire reserves. Com¬
panies will be able to mine ore which is most conveniently
situated to their operations without regard to previous property
lines. The government will be able to ensure that a mix of
acceptable ore grades is mined rather than having the highest
grade creamed off first, and maybe leave Jamaica with less
marketable ore in a few years.
Equity in the Operations
The government of Jamaica is purchasing 51 percent of
all mining operations. This does not only mean that Jamaica
will be the supplier of raw material (bauxite), but will be
full partner in the operations. This entails sharing risk and
benefits, getting access to the technology and marketing of a
gigantic international business. Government nominees are mem¬
bers of the managing committees of the local companies, and a
process had started in which Jamaicans will eventually occupy
the highest positions in the joint-venture.
The 51 percent formula is applied in different ways.
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depending on whether the operation includes alumina processing.
In the case of Alcoa, the mining cannot be separated from the
alumina processing operations in practice, so a value was
assigned to the mining assets of which the government's 51
percent would cost $8 million at book value. This $8 million
was applied to the total operations in Jamaica at book value
to give Jamaica a 6 percent share. This six percent share
represents assets worth $18 millions today. But Jamaica is
only paying $8 million, which is the book value.
In addition, the government will have two to seven mem¬
bers of the managing committee of all joint ventures with the
six companies.
The new Kaiser-Jamaica Bauxite Company is an example of
how the principles work in a purely bauxite mining operation:
51 percent is applied to all the existing facilities. The book
value of Jamaica's share is U.S. $5.61 million, again much less
than the current replacement value. The government will have
four members of the 8-man managing committee, though Kaiser
remains the managing partner for the first seven years,
How Jamaica Will Pay for Her Share
The Jamaican government will not be paying for her share
in a Itimp-sxjm, but over a period of 10 years (so that it should
all be paid off by 1987). All Jamaica's acquisitions are bought
at written-down book value, not current market value. Therefore,
an acre of land bought by a particular company in 1960 for $100
would be repurchased by the government today for $100.
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The balances owed on Jamaica's purchases will attract
interest-land purchases at 7 percent and mining equity at 8.5
percent. Nevertheless, while the stnn of money involved is
considerable, the terms are nevertheless exceedingly favourable
to Jamaica. An outsider buying into the company would have
paid four times the price for the same equity. The industry will
be providing revenue to the government for the levy and royalty,
from the investment yield, and some from the leasing of lands
to the companies for mining. The leasing fee will be 7 percent
of the purchase price of the land. In brief, the business will
generate much more than is necessary to pay for Jamaica's share
in the space of ten years.
Production Levy
The government has fixed the price of its baxixite at
50 cents per ton royalty plus 7.5 percent of whatever aluminxjm
ingot is sold for. This basic rate remains in force for eight
years before a fresh review.
As any buyer and seller situation, Jamaica wants the
highest possible return for bauxite while the aluminiam companies
would like to pay as little as possible for their raw material.
Naturally also, the companies wish to get the highest price
possible for the metal they sell. It is to this circvnnstance
that the bauxite production levy is linked.
As the price of ingot goes up or down, Jamaica's return
from the levy increases or decreases even though the rate is con¬
stant. Of course aluminum prices may fluctuate from month to
month, so for purposes of the levy "the price" is the average
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price realised over a calendar year.
It was expected that control of the above four key
aspects of the bauxite mining operations, by Jamaica, was to
give the economy a major boost.
The government of Jamaica had said that "the control
of bauxite will enable it to see that the lands are well used,
before and after mining." Before mining, the land will be
leased or used for government farms. After mining it will be
used for planting long-tern crops, or for settling people.
Where the companies had farmed the land, leased it, or settled
people on it, the government will keep on doing so.
The British magazine, "The Economist" had predicted in
July of '75 that the increase in the per tonnage price of bauxite
to $14.5, would yield Jamaica roughly $70 million between the
accounting period 1974-1975.
Moreover, the domestic capitalists of Jamaica saw the
bauxite levy as a way to capture a large part of the companies
profits to finance their import bill and to enlarge the state
budget.
It is within these great expectations that a more detailed
analysis of the impacts of nationalization on the Jamaican eco¬
nomy will be carried out. Subjects to be discussed are:
1. Utilization of bauxite land
2. Government revenue
3. Employment in the baiaxite industry
4. Bauxite and altmainxmi production
5. Markets.
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Optimal Utilization of Batixite Land: New Policies
As a result of the first round of negotiations between
the government of Jamaica and the bauxite/alumina companies in
1974, it was decided that the government would acquire all baux¬
ite lands owned by the companies.
This decision by the government was not merely a
nationalistic gesture but also (a) to enable a better rationali¬
zation and allocation of the island's bauxite reserves, and (b)
to fully utilize the lands for agricultural production until
they are required for mining.
The principles of the negotiations are as follows;
1. The government would purchase all lands owned by
the companies, except those lands required for
plants, roads, railway and ports which amount to
15,000 acres.
2. Lands would be purchased from the companies at the
"written down book value."
3. Within the area of influence around each company's
plant, a baiixite reserves area would be allocated
which would satisfy the ore requirements of the
plant for forty years, based on its annual capacity.
It is well recognized that the maximum return from Jamaica's
bauxite land would be from the mining of the lands, and that
before mining such lands should be cultivated for maximum land
utilization. The principles to enable the optimal sequential
utilization of Jamaica's baxixite lands are therefore: first,
the lands should be used for agricultural activities; secondly,
the lands should be mined and restored; and thirdly, the re¬
stored lands may be used for farming, housing or whatever
activity they are best suited for.
Working with the bauxite companies, the ministry of
agriculture and the town planning department, the Jamaica Baxaxite
Institute is responsible for planning, coordinating and monitor¬
ing the utilization of all bauxite bearing land in the country.
Within the bauxite reserve areas, the JBI and the com¬
panies established mining plans in terms of 5, 10, 15 and 20
year mining blocks. These mine plans are being made known to
all relevant agencies. The five-year mining blacks designated
for immediate mining would be retained exclusively for mining
purposes. Those lands outside of the immediate five-year mining
blocks would be made available for agriculture under the follow¬
ing conditions:
1. That no physical or permanent structures be
erected nor capital-intensive development be
carried out on the bauxite lands.
2. That agricultural planning and land use should
be scheduled to make that lands available for
mining as dedicated by the established mine plans.
Before mining, the land may be used for lease hold farm¬
ing, cattle farming, forestry or other approved types of farming.
The household farming is to be managed by the project land lease
programme in the ministry of agriculture. Cattle farming will
be concentrated on established pasture lands, and will also
make use of reclaimed lands. Forestry is to be concentrated on
the marginal lands, mostly the limestone hills between the baux¬
ite deposits.
On a wider, regional basis, in conjunction with the town
planning department, the JBI is assisting in the preparation of
"Development orders" for the various parishes on the island,
clearly outlining the bauxite bearing areas where physical de¬
velopment must be restricted prior to mining operations. Con¬
stant monitoring is also carried out in an effort to control the
subdivision and fragmentation of lands required for mining. In
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addition, the institute works closely with the town planning
department to restrict the spread of township over bauxite
lands.
New Approach to Resettlement
In order to tackle the real problem of consolidating
the thousands of small holdings for mining blocks, a new
approach to resettlement had to be taken by the Jamaican govern¬
ment. The government recognizing that it is dealing with people
and not just lands, attention had to be given to the sociologi¬
cal factors as well as the economic ones. It is also recognized
that the people to be relocated from the bavixite lands, their
traditional homes and communities, should be given more than just
a "fair deal" for their lands. They should also be able to enjoy
some of the benefits derived from the exploitation of the mineral
in their communities.
In order to achieve these objectives, the following
courses of action have been taken:
1. A general public education programme to inform people
of the importance of bauxite to the country, their
legal rights, and plans for direct benefits to them
2. Comprehensive socioeconomic surveys of the bauxite
bearing areas where resettlement is needed, in order
to determine the attitude of the people toward
resettlement, and their requirements.
3. Investigations to establish potential resettlement
plans to be started for such areas
4. Working actively with the bauxite companies in order
to effect the consolidation of mining blocks and
satisfactory resettlement for the people to be relocated
In the final phase, work also has to be done with the
bauxite companies and other relevant agencies with regard to
the utilization of the mined-out lands. Preplanning has to be




The importance of the baxixite and alumina sector to
the Jamaican economy is further illustrated by its contribution
to government revenue. Revenues from levies and royalties
amounted to approximately U.S. $189.3 million, in 1977, the
highest since the introduction of the levy in 1974, and about
45 percent above the 1976 level of $130.3 million. The improve¬
ment over 1976 is due to increase in bauxite and alumina exports
and a higher average realized price of alxjminum ingot which
moved from U.S. $42.52c per lb. in 1976 to U.S. $50.97c per
lb. in 1977.
As a result of the nationalization of the bauxite in¬
dustry, government revenue has increased enormously. To get a
clearer picture, one can investigate government revenue derived
from the industry. For example, in table 1, between the years
1972-1977 one realizes that in 1972, before nationalization,
the total government revenue was $22.71 million, of which
$3.07 million was royalties and $19.64 million was corporate
taxes. In 1973, total revenue increased from 1972 $22.71 mil¬
lion to $24.52 million.
However, in 1974, the tax taken from the bauxite industry
rose by seven times the amount received in 1973. While revenue
declined in 1975 and 1976 because of worldwide recession, strikes-
^om 1974 to 1975 the number of strikes in the Jamaica bauxite/
alxmaina industry doubled and doubled again from 1975 to 1976.
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The Jamaican Bauxite Institute estimated that an 81-day strike
at Alcoa, a 43-day shut-down at Alpart (a refining venture
owned by Reynolds, Anaconda and Kaiser), and a 35-day strike
at Alcan during the first six months of 1976 cost the industry
over 400,000 tons of baxixite production)-and production cutbacks
in both bauxite and alumina, by 1977 it had risen above the
1974 level. While the production cutbacks were partially due
to industry-wide reductions in response to international reces¬
sion, Jamaica suffered a disproportional cutback. While U.S.
alxominum companies doubled their bauxite imports from African
sources in Guinea, they cut back their imports from Jamaica by
30 percent, for a net industry-wide reduction in U.S. bauxite
imports of 20 percent.
Nevertheless, one reason as can be seen, for the in¬
creased revenue was the use of the "production levy" to "index"
Jamaica's tax rate to the selling price of aluminiom ingot (in
addition to setting the tax rate at more than twice the previous
level) . Thus the doubling of aluminxam prices (from 25 cents a
pound in 1973 to 54 cents in 1977) gave a major boost to Ja¬
maica's tax return, and both are likely to increase in the
future. An additional U.S. $138.2 million was brought in by
the companies to cover local expenditures bringing total na¬
tional receipts from the industry to U.S. $375.5 million.
To realize the importance of the bauxite industry, one
can compare its pa3mient with other source of government tax
revenue in the table 2. It is evident that no source provides
as much revenue to the government as from the bauxite and
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TABLE 1
GOVERNMENT REVENUE FROM THE BAUXITE INDUSTRY
1972-1977 (Ja. $ millions)
Source of Revenue 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Royalties 3.07 3.44 7.17 5.4 4.8 n/a
Corporate Taxes 19.64 21.07 20.27 14.9 * n/a
Production Levy -- -- 142.8 121.1 116.5 n/a
Total 22.71 24.51 170.34 141.4 121.3 185
*Included a production levy
Sources Jamaica Baiixite Institute, "Royalties, Income Tax and
the Bauxite Levy 1972-76," National Planning Agency, Economic
and Social Survey Jamaica, 1976 Jamaican Weekly Gleaner
(February 20, 1978).
alviminum sector. The only other source which came close is
personal income tax.
Employment
Due to the very nature of bauxite mining and production,
the employment condition in the industry was virtually at a
standstill. For example, in the years 1970, 1971, and 1972,
persons employed in the mining and processing were 5,493, 6,162
and 6,756,^ respectively. However, after nationalization, even
though employment in 1976 fell below 1972's employment level
to 6,266, 1977 saw employment in the industry improved over
1976 level to a new high of 6,305; still lower than 1972's.
The 1977 increased employment by the baiixite-alvimina
companies was in mining and processing with a labour force of
4,886 or 19 percent above 1976 employment of 4,113.
^Michael Manley, Politics of Change (Andre' Deutch,
Ltd., 1974), p, 102.
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TABLE 2
SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE, 1974-1975
TO 1977-78 J$in
1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78
Custom* 57.9 83.9 39.0 26.8
Excise 57.4 52.9 48.5 52.0
Consumption Duty 43.9 75.1 114.0 131.5
Personal Income Tax 106.3 123.3 144.9 135.3
Corporate Income Tax 78.5 71.5 74.1 67.2
Land and Property Tax 12.0 22.4 21.0 22.5
Death Duties (5) 0.0 0.0 0.0
Stamp Duties 16.5 16.9 14.0 14.4
Motor Vehicle Licenses 6.8 9.4 10.4 13.5
Other Licenses 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.15
Entertainment Tax 1.8 1.9 2.3 0.1
Travel Tax 1.3 1.8 1.4 0.7
Betting, Gaming & Lotteries 3.5 4.1 5.9 7.9
Tax De Sejour 0.9 1.1 2.0 0.60
Retail Sales Tax 6.9 12.6 7.1 2.15
Telephone Tax 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.1
SUB-TOTAL TAX REVENUE 394.4 477.5 484.8 484.9
*Payments From B/A Industry 138.7 149.2 151.0 144.4
Sources: 1. Economic and Social Survey, 1976 - NPA
2. J.B.I.
*It should be noted that whereas the levy payments cover calendar years the
other sources of government tax revenue are based on fiscal years. For a
more meaningful comparison therefore, it was necessary to convert the levy
figures from calendar to fiscal years.
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Employment in the companies' agricultural sub-sectors
declined with government's acquisition of much of the com¬
panies' land and diverting the labour to project land lease.
An illustration of this can be seen in table 3.
The industry is of course, largely capital intensive
which capar from production, affects the ability of the sector
to expand employment. The impact of the industry on the
national employment figures has been minimal, accounting for
some 0.9 percent in 1977; table 4 illustrates.
Although the industry doesn't contribute significantly
to the employed labour force, its contribution to the wage bill
is substantial. The Department of Statistics reports that in
December 1976 while the average weekly earnings for wage earners
from the mining, manufacturing, electricity and private construc¬
tion was $66.27, the wage earner in the mining sector (of which
TABLE 3
EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS FOR THE JAMAICAN BAUXITE AND
ALUMINA INDUSTRY FOR THE YEARS 1976-1977
1976 1977




Other ) 1,837 1,193
TOTAL 6,266 6,305
Source: 1. Jamaica Bauxite Institute




PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION TO EMPLOYED LABOUR
FORCE BY MAJOR SECTORS 1975-1977
1975 1976 1977
Agriculture 33.3 35.57 35.37
Public Administration 14.4 15.5 16.13
Other Services 16.8 14.35 13.91
Commerce 12.0 11.76 12.81
Manufacturing 10.8 11.01 11.06
Construction and Installation 6.5 5.53 4.78
Transport 4.6 4,59 4.29
Bauxite /Altunina 0.91 0.92 0.91
Other Mining 0.18 0.22 0.16
Not Specified 0.51 0.51 0.58
100 100 100
Source: Department of Statistics, Jamaica.
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baiixite/alumina constitutes the largest part) earned $138.87.
In December 1977 the worker in the mining sector received, on
average, a weekly wage of $171.17 compared to the $75.46
average for all the sectors. For further illustration, see
table 5.
TABLE 5
AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS FOR WAGE EARNERS
DEC. 1976 AND DEC. 1977 IN $
Dec. 1976 Dec. 1977
Weighted Average of 4 Sectors 66.27 75.46
Average of Mining Sector Only 158.87 171.17
Average of Electricity Sector Only
Average of Private Construction
124.31 154.10
Sector Only 72.11 83.33
Average of Manufacturing Sector Only 53.02 60.41
Baxjxite and Aluminvim Production
Bauxite and alumina production and export at the end of
June 1978 were running at levels similar to those for the cor¬
responding first half of 1977.
Total baxncite production was 5.57 million tonnes, a
half-point decline from 5.6 million tonnes in 1977.
Bauxite exports were 3.09 million tonnes for the period
as against 3.21 million tonnes-3.7 percent behind.
Alumina shipments for 1978 were 4.1 percent or 1.01
million tonnes from 970,000 tonnes for the first half of 1977.
The figures show a slow-down in the second quarter of
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1978 after a good start in the first quarter. Total bauxite
mined in the first quarter was 2.4 percent ahead of first
'quarter 1977 while alvunina exports were up 17 percent.
As can be seen in table 6 » in 1977 there was a marked
improvement over 1976 production. The improvement in pro¬
duction showed a 24.5 percent increase. In 1976 industrial
unrest at all three operating plants and a major accident at
Alcoa's Clarendon Alumina Works affected scheduled production
by 400,000 tonnes. In 1975, bauxite, rather than almina,
production was affected by industrial unrest and other incidents
resulting in the loss of some 718,000 tonnes of scheduled pro¬
duction.
Despite the improvements of 1976, production was still
far below the peak year of 1974. This is a result of, inter alia
(among other things); Ca) the relatively slow pace of recovery in
the market economies, (b) the virtual phasing out of some
600,000 tonnes per annum of bauxite exportation by Alcoa min¬
erals of Jamaica, by previous understanding, later confirmed
during the negotiations of 1975/1976; (c) the phasing out of
scheduled ba\axite production by Reynolds due to technological
incompatibility of the Jamaican bauxite in their joint venture
(with the West German firm. Yaw Altunina Plant at Stade, West
Germany; (d) the closure of the Revere Jamaica alumina plant
since August 1975; and (e) the loss by Alcan Jamaica, Ltd. of
alumina markets, particular in Scandinavia, of which some, but
not all were recovered by other Jamaican-based companies.
TABLE 6
JAMAICA'S BAUXITE AND ALUMINA PRODUCTION 1974-1977

















1974 7,999,468 - 7,328,171 - 15,237,639 - 2,805,147 -
1975 5,482,426 -31.47 6,087,838 -16.93 11,570,264 -24.1 -15.3
1976 6,283,724 +14.62 4,027,453 -33.84 10,311,177 -10.9 1,622,486 -31.7
1977 6,354,801 + 1.13 5,078,483 +26.10 11,433,284 +10.9 2,035,901 +25.5
Source: Jamaica Bauxite Institute Digest, vol. 2.
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Jamaica Back at No. 2 Behind Australia
In 1911, Jamaica had regained the nxamber two spot from
Guinea in the list of top bauxite producers. Guinea produced
10.8 million (metric) tonnes in 1977 to Jamaica's 11.4 mil¬
lion tonnes. Guinea's output was a 4 percent decline from the
previous year's performance while Jamaica rose 10.9 percent.
Meantime Australia continued to stretch its lead in the
number one position, recording a massive 1 million tonne in¬
crease to 26 million tonnes. Australia has been the world's
leading producer since 1971 and now mines 30.5 percent of the
world's total which was 85.5 million tonnes last year. This
is illustrated below in table 7
TABLE 7
WORLD BAUXITE PRODUCTION 1975-1977 (000 metric Tonnes)
7o Change
1975 1976 1977 77/76
1. Australia 21,008 24,985 26,074 4.4
2. Jamaica 11,571 10,311 11,433 10.9
3. Guinea 7,674 11,316 10,871 3.9
4. USSR 6,000 6,700 6,700^ -
5. Suriname 4,929 4,612 4,951 7.4
6. Guyana 3,559 3,134 3,915 24.9
7. Hungary 2,890 2,918 2.9483, 1.0
8. Greece 3,006 2,747 2,700^ 1.7
9. France 2,562 2,315 2,080 10.2
10. Yugoslavia 2,306 2,033 2,044 0.5
11. U.S.A. 1,831 1,989 1,990 0.05
Sub Total (Top 11) 67,336 73,060 75,706 3.6
Others 9,921 7,461 9,796 31.3
GRAND TOTAL 77,257 80,521 85,502 6.2




Baxixite was sold entirely in the U, S, A, during
1977. But for some 109,000 tonnes exported by Reynolds to
their Stade (West Germany) plant in 1974, this has been the
pattern during the history of the industry. Alxmiina export
on the other hand, continued its varied pattern between 1974
and 1977 (table 8 provides comparative data for the years 1974
to 1977).
Western Europe and North American are Jamaica’s two
major market areas for alumina, with the U.S.A., Norway, the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Sweden being the major receiving
countries.
Even though the above countries have been Jamaica's
traditional importers of Alumina, the Jamaican government has
signed nxamerous agreements to supply alumina to other countries.
For example, Jamaica has signed a 10-year contract with Algeria
to supply 150,000 tonnes of alumina a year beginning in 1981.
The value of the deal, which is renewable, has been put in the
region of $300 million.
Senator Dudley Thompson, fcrmer Minister of Mining,
signed the contract on Wednesday, February 8, 1978 in Algiers,
and made the announcement on his return to Jamaica at a press
conference at Norman Manley Airport.
This contract added to the 300,000 ton-per-year con¬
tract with Mexico signed November 1977.
The Algerian contract concludes an agreement in prin¬
ciple which was entered into two years ago. The sale will
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TABLE 3











U.S.A. 952 682 532 693 33.9 28.7 32.8 34.0
Canada 178 96 24 221 6.4 4.0 1.5 10.9
Total 1,130 778 556 915 40.3 32.8 34.3 44.9
SOUTH AMERICA
Brazil 9 3 0.4 0.2
Trinidad 0.2 * - - - •
Venezuela 48.0 15 115 36 1.7 0.6 7.1 1.8
Total 48.2 24 118 36 1.7 1.0 7.3 1.8
EUROPE
Norway 614.2 553 434.5 563 21.9 22.4 26.8 27.7
United Kingdom 442.2 489 263 358 15.8 20.6 16.2 17.6
Sweden 105 92 152 82 3.7 3.9 9.4 4.0
Spain 89 131 35 - 3.2 5.5 2.2 -
Holland 16.5 - 22 8 0.6 - 1.4 0.4
U.S.S.R. 143 146 - - 5.1 6.1 - -
Poland 78.1 56 28 - 2.8 2.4 1.7 -
Total 1,488.0 1,447 935 1,011 53.0 60.9 57.6 49.7
AFRICA
Ghana 119.4 125 14 75 4.3 5.3 0.9 3.7
OCEANIA
New Zealand 19.5 - - - 0.7 - - -
fy r% f\c “% n o -7 e 1 ^ o o c o no £ ^ nn 1 nn 1 nn 1 nn
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bring in an estimated $30 million per year, but Senator Thompson
explained that the actual figure will be determined by the
prevailing price of aluminum ingot to which the price of the
aluminum has been indexed in the contract.
In addition, Iraq has agreed to buy 150,000 tons of
alumina annually from Jamaica for an aliiminum smelter plant,
construction of which is due to start in 1980.^
The agreement was the result of last week's visit to
Baghdad by Prime Minister, Hon. Michael Manley, the Minister
of Mining, Hon. Horace Clark, the Minister of State in the
Minister of Finance, Senator the Hon. Richard Fletcher and a
2
number of government officials.
Earlier in the month, on a one-day visit to Caracas,
the Venezuelan government assured Prime Minister Manley of a
continuing commitment to a one-million-ton contract with peak
sales of 200,000 tons in 1981. Supply contracts have also been
reconfirmed by the Soviet Union (250,000 tons a year, long ton).
However, Jamaica's markets are of course affected by
the pricing policies and the production of other countries.
Table 9 shows bauxite production by other countries between 1974
and 1977. This data point to the significant growth of Australia
and Guinea and the decline of the Caribbean producers. These
Caribbean producers include, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti,
and Jamaica.





WORLD BAUXITE PRODUCTION BY IBA MEMBER COUNTRIES











Australia 20,065 25.5 24,985 29.9 26,074 30.5
Dominican Republic 1,477 1.9 529 0.7 721 0.8
Ghana 421 0.5 268 0.3 235 0.3
Guinea 5,010 6.4 11,316 14.1 10,871 12.7
Guyana 3,168 4.0 3,134 3.9 3,915 4.6
Haiti 641 0.8 635 0.8 588 0.7
Indonesia 1,290 1.6 940 1.2 1,301 1.5
Jamaica 15,238 19.4 10,311 12.8 11,433 13.4
Sierra Leone 672 0.9 651 0.8 740 0.9
Suriname 6,385 8.1 4,612 5.7 4,951 5.8
Yougoslavia 2,370 3.0 2,033 2.5 2,044 2.4
TOTAL 56,737 72.2 58,514 72.7 62,873 73.5
NON IBA 21,807 27.8 22,007 27.3 22,629 26.5
World Total 78,544 100.0 80,521 100.0 85,502 100.0
In sum, the nationalization of the baxixite industry has
brought with it massive increases in government revenue. Most of
this revenue resulted from the "production levy" which the govern¬
ment has placed on all baxaxite mined or alimiina produced in
Jamaica.
The production of bauxite has been on the decrease,
except for a few isolated years, due to low international demand,
ntimerous strikes at plants in Jamaica and the general mood of
ideological instability on the island.
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The acquisition of bauxite land by the government has
resulted in its optimal utilization. This is in terms of farm
production and housing settlement and resettlement before and
after mining. In itself, this means a larger contribution of




Our primary objective has been to analyse the impact
of the baiixite industry on the Jamaican economy, before and
after nationalization.
According to the evidence presented, the presence of
the baiaxite industry (MNCs) in Jamaica, prior to nationaliza¬
tion, has had a tremendous impact on the Jamaican economy.
One of the most significant areas is its contribution to aggre
gate income. As classified by the National Statistical Office
of Jamaica, aggregate income is grouped into four categories:
1. Money spent on materials and supplies,
purchased by the MNCs from domestic
firms
2. Wages and salaries
3. Taxes and royalties paid to the government
4. Money spent on capital goods, purchased by
the MNCs from domestic firms
VThile these contributions represent more than a notice
able difference in national income account, they are signifi¬
cantly less than their total contribution to output. This is
reflected in the comparison of the year to year changes of
the bauxite gross domestic product as a percentage of national
gross domestic product, and the year to year changes of baux¬
ite local pa3nnent as a percentage of GNP.
64
65
The reason for the small level of contributions (pay¬
ments) results from the share of value added which accrues to
national as compared to foreign factors of production.
Nevertheless, royalties and taxes paid by the MNCs
represent a major contribution to government revenue. In addi¬
tion, the industry became the largest single taxpayer in the
economy; in 1976, it accounted for twenty percent of all tax
revenues. This revenue, however, was relatively small in com¬
parison to the value created by the industry. The relatively
small tax revenue resulted from:
a) The companies consistency in undervalueting
the price of Jamaican baiixite ore
b) The difficulty faced in establishinji a market
price upon which to base taxation. This is
due to the vertical integration of the industry.
Another major contributor to the national economy is
capital expenditure, the bulk of which goes to materials and
supplies, and as wages paid to construction workers. However,
capital expenditure increases most drastically when there are
periods of expansion. For example, during the first decades of
1950-1969, the bavixite industry spent over 25 million pounds
in Jamaica. During the next decade, the level of capital
expenditure increased 35 million.
In the area of employment, the amount of labour employed
in the industry averaged 6,600 persons between 1958-1972. Even
though this nvimber represented a minor percentage of national
employment, workers in the industry earned the highest wage
rate and income level in comparison to all other sectors of the
economy. However, due to the nature of the high capital labour
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ratio of the bauxite industry, the wage bill paid out by it is
a small fraction of total wages paid in Jamaica.
The manufacturing sector of the economy has benefitted
the least, if any at all, from the industry. This is because
the majority of the goods used in the benefication of bauxite
ore to aliimina is not produced by the manufacturing sector.
The ownership of bauxite land by the MNCs is substantial;
about seven percent of Jamaica's land surface. This land is
used for the mining of bauxite ore. However, even though the
processing of bauxite mining and alumina production does not
require agricultural inputs, the companies have undertaken
farming operations. This involves animal husbandry, and the
planting of cash crops. The latter has improved the produc¬
tivity of the land occupied by them. However, these products
have not benefitted the Jamaican people, as they are exported
as consumption goods.
As the companies became more established, their presence
caused important changes in the labour force, such as
a) The deterioration of the peasant agriculture
b) Growth of the industrial proletariat
In addition, because workers in the industry are well
paid, the areas adjacent to the baiaxite enclave suffers from
massive inflation. Consequently, the high cost of living and
the acute shortage of arable land have resulted in the accelera¬
tion of the migration of the peasantry to the cities in search
of work. But the general shortage of job opportunities in the
cities, results in an increasing number of the urban population
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being pushed into a swelling Itmipen proletariat. Thus an in^
creasing amount of illegal activities and political thuggery
have been the order of the day.
In 1974 the government of Jamaica, under the leadership
of Prime Minister Michael Manley, nationalized the bauxite mining
industry, thus giving Jamaica 51 percent shareholdings.
A closer look at the reasons for the nationalization of
the bauxite industry will reveal it evolved from conditions of
necessity rather than greed. These conditions manifested them¬
selves as the rising cost of imported manufactured goods, in¬
creasing balance of payment debts, and high "OPEC” oil prices.
Nevertheless, the lack of Jamaica's ability to generate alternative
sources of revenue, resulting from limited endowment, has naturally
chartered a course for it to secure higher prices for its most
valuable resource. Thus, it has become a shareholder in the
industry, to guard against inflated prices in the international
markets.
The nationalization of the bauxite industry has brought
with it massive increases in government revenue. Most of this
revenue resulted from the "production levy" which the government
has placed on all bauxite mined or alumina produced in Jamaica.
The production of bavixite has been on the decrease except
for a few isolated years, due to low international demand,
numerous strikes at plants in Jamaica and the general mood of
political instability on the island. The acquisition of bauxite
land by the government has resulted in its optimal utilization.
This is in terms of farm production and housing settlement and
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resettlement before and after mining. In itself, this means a
larger contribution of farm products to the value of all goods
dnd services produced within the economy.
Employment in the industry has decreased, which is
explained by, inter alia, the purchase of the industry's bavixite
farming land and diverting the labour used on the said farming
land to project land lease; the decrease in construction of
bauxite facilities; construction constitutes approximately six¬
teen percent of total employment in bauxite production according
to estimates by the Jamaica Planning Agency.
Evidence shows that nationalization has meant very little
to the Jamaican people in the short run. Preliminary estimates
of the Jamaican Planning Agency reports no major changes in the
development of Jamaica fundamental to the nationalization of the
bauxite industry.
Nevertheless, this should not be seen as a permanent
trend of nationalization, but as the inefficiency of any politi¬
cal system to implement major changes in the short run. Never¬
theless, nationalization should be seen in the.overall plan of
the government's long run programs to benefit all Jamaicans.
Some of these programs, which are and will be financed
by income derived from nationalization of bauxite, are:
1. Free education to university level
2. National literacy program
3. Easy loans for businessmen
4. Higher rates for minimum wages
Increase in school feeding program5.
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6. Employment for thousands of Jamaicans
(similar to ”CETA”)
7. New schools and colleges
8. New and better roads
9. More hospitals, etc.,
just to mention a few.
In response to the question, how have the interest of
the bauxite/alxraiina companies been affected by the Jamaican
government actions and what has Jamaica gained? As far as the
bauxite levy is concerned, the bauxite/aliamina companies (like
the oil companies) have been able to pass along tax increases
to consvimers of altiminivim. In fact, the hightened bauxite
levies accounted for almost twenty-five percent of the rise in
aluminum prices in 1974. The companies simply took advantage
of the levies to justify prices hikes to increase profits.^
Yet the companies' present situation in Jamaica is
hardly ideal, since every free enterprise concerns prefer com¬
plete freedom to make price and production decisions— an area
where the IBA and Jamaican government now have some influence.
However, even though the alxaminum companies may no
longer have total control, they have worked out an accommoda¬
tion that meets their objective. Their profits are not threa¬
tened; they have appeased the nationalist sentiments of the Man-
ley government; they still exercise decisive power in management
^See C. Fred Bergsten, "A New OPEC in Bauxite,"
Challenge (July-August 1976), p. 18.
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decisions; and they have guaranteed themselves access to ore
supplies by giving the Jamaican government a stake in the future
success of their venture.
Although the partial success of the Jamaican government
in breaking the stranglehold of the bauxite companies on the
industry should not be underestimated, the continuing superioriry
of the companies in technology, capital resources and control of
markets seriously limits any challenge to their power. This
limitation will continue to hamper the efforts of third World
countries to obtain better terms from the transnations (MNCs).
The Jamaican government clearly took the power of the
aluminum companies into account in opting for a joint venture
rather than complete nationalization. In Guyana, where the
government made another choice by nationalizing Alcan in 1971,
marketing and management difficulties had followed. For Jamaica,
the partnership route was seen by the government as a cautious
alternative that would not disrupt the economy and lead to
some of the problems Guyana had faced.
Jamaica has, however, made some strides in overcoming
total dependence on the companies by working out cooperative
arrangements with other third world governments. One of these
agreements (with Mexico) envisions a jointly owned industry
comprising bauxite mining, alumina refining and alumina smelt¬
ing. Jamaica is to provide the ore and alumina which would then
be shipped to Mexico, where power is cheap, for smelting to
aluminum ingot. Jamaica is to have majority ownership of the
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mining and refining while Mexico will own the majority of the
smelter.
Along with numerous other joint venture agrements, the
possible future impact of such joint arrangements on the inter¬
national market cannot be overlooked. However, these joint
venture government projects have to be seen as part of a trend
toward "state capitalism" in the third world— a development that
needs much further study. It is clear, though, that in Jamaica
as well as other Latin American countries, important sectors
of the capitalist class realise that they stand to benefit from
the greater involvement of the state in the economy.^ However,
under a progressive government, the capitalist state will channel
benefits to the working class only insofar as is incessary to
stabilize the situation.
^See, for example, NACLA Report (September-October 1977),
on the case of Mexico.
APPENDIX A
Profile on the Altimihimi Companies
Operating in Jamaica
Prior to 1974 six companies controlled the production
of bauxite and aluminum in Jamaica: Alcoa, Alcan, Reynolds,
Kaiser, Pechiney and Alusuisse. Four of these— Alcoa, Alcan,
Re3niolds and Kaiser, referred to in the political circles of
Jamaica as the "Big Four" of North America—controlled virtually
all of Jamaica's bauxite and alumina production.
Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA)
Alcoa is the world's largest alximinum company and ranked
nxamber 72 on Fortune's list of the top 500 U.S. industrial com¬
panies. It had a 1976 sale of $2.9 billion. Based in Pittsburgh
and controlled by the Mellon and Davis families, its interest
includes mining in Jamaica, Surinam, the Dominican Republic,
Australia, Guinea and Brazil, as well as the U.S. Alcoa cut
its dependency on Caribbean bauxite from 84 percent in 1972 to
38 percent in 1975. Its smelters are located in the U.S.,Aus¬
tralia, Brazil, Mexico and elsewhere.
Alcan Alumin^ml
Alcan is the world's second largest aluminum company
and ranks number 84 on Fortune's list of the top non-U.S. in¬
dustrialists. Though based in Montreal, it also is controlled
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by the Mellon and Davis families. Alcan mines bauxite in
Jamaica, Australia, Guinea, Malaysia and Trance and is develop¬
ing a major deposit in Brazil. Its Guyana mines were nation¬
alized in 1971. Alcan’s main smelter capacity is located in
Quebec, Japan and Norway.
Teynolds Metal Company
Reynolds Metal Company is the third largest al\aminum
company, and ranked niamber 180 among U.S. industrials. It had
a $2.1 billion sales in 1976. Based in Richmond, Va., it is
controlled by the Reynolds family and mines bauxite in Jamaica,
Haiti and Arkansas, Its Guyana mines were nationalized in
1975. Re3molds' smelter includes plants in the U.S., Canada,
and the U.K,, where it has a 48 percent interest in England's
largest alxmainxmi company. It plans to cut its heavy depen¬
dence on Jamaica baiixite through a large joint venture with
Alcoa in Australia.
Kaiser Alumintjm and Chemical Company
This company is the fourth largest aluminum company and
ranked number 122 among U.S. industrials. It had a 1976 sale
of $1.9 billion. Based in Oakland, California, it is con¬
trolled by the Kaiser family. Its principal baxixite mines are
located in Jamaica and Australia and it smelts aluminxmi in the
U.S., Ghana, the U.K., West Germany and Bahrain.
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Pechlney Ugine Kuhltoan
Pechiney is a French controlled metal company, is
Europe's largest aluminum producer, as well as its largest
copper fabricator and producer of stainless steel. Its 1976
sales of $4.7 billion ranked it number 37 among non-U.S.
industrial companies. Its bauxite sources include Australia,
Guinea, Greece and France. Pechiney's U.S. alxaminum capacity
was acquired in 1975 through the purchase of Howmet Corporation.
Swiss Aliimimam (Alusuisse)
Alusuisse had a 1976 sales of $1.9 billion, ranked
niomber 113 among non-U.S. industrials and is the sixth largest
aluminum producer. Based in Zurich and controlled by Swiss
capital, it expanded outside of Europe only after World War II.
It obtained three-fourths of its baiixite from Australia and
also mines in Sierra Leone, Guinea and France. Its smelters
are located in Switzerland, the U.S., Germany, Iceland, Italy,









Government buys bus and electric power
companies
Government meets with other bauxite-producing
nations to discuss formation of the Inter¬
national Bauxite Association (IBA)
Bauxite levy legislation passed
Alcoa, Reynolds and Kaiser file suit with the
International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Dispute against Jamaica
Kaiser agrees to sell 51 percent of its
mining operations and all land to govern¬
ment
Reynolds agrees to same









Government purchases telephone company from
Continental Telephone
Revere files $64 million claim with U.S.
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
Alcoa agrees to sell 51 percent of mining
assets and all land to government
Government nationalizes Barclay's Bank
IBA establishes bauxite common pricing accord
75
BIBLIOGRAPHY
’’Alpart 10 years of Progress/* in A Daily Gleaner Supplement
June 8, 1979, Jamaica.
Barnet, Richard J. and Muller Ronald E. Global Reach; The Power
of the Multinatiohal Corporations. New York: Simpson and
Schuster, 197 !
Beckford, George. "Plantations, Peasants, and Proletariat in
West Indies," in Socialism, vol. 1, no. 3 (September
1974), Kingston, JamaicaT~
Bergsten, Fred C. "A New Opel in Bauxite," in Challenge
July-August 1976.
Capital Development Fund Annual Report, 1974
Chambers, Gillett N. The Regulatory Structure: Past and Present
Chief Land Branch, Jamaica Bauxite Industry, Jamaica.
Charles River Associates. Policy Implicatiohs of Producer
Country Supply Restrictions: The World Alumin\jm/Bauxite
Market. U.S. Department of Commerce, March 1977.
Committee on Public Administration Cases. The Disposal of the
Aluminxjm Plants. Washington, D. C., 1948.
Department of Statistics, Government of Jamaica. National
Income and Product Account. Jamaica, 1976.
. Statistical Yearbook of Jamaica, Jamaica, 1974.
. The Labor Force, Jamaica, 1976.
"European Wanted," in The Economist. The Economist Newspaper
Limited, London, December 1979, p. 84.
Engle, N. H, "World Bauxite Resources," in Aluminum. Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., 1944.
Faundez, Julio and Picciolto, Sol. The Nationalization of
Multinationals in Peripheral Economies. Home and Meir
Publishers, 1972. o l8^!
Gentles. Hu. Jamaica and the Bauxite Companies; What the Agree-
mehts Mean. Jamaica Baxixite Institute.
76
77
Giryan, Noman, Foreign Capital and Economic Underdevelopment
in Jamaica. Institute of Social and Economic Research.
University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica, 1972.
Historical Overview of the Buaxite/Alxamina Industry," in The
Gleaner, December 21, 1979, pp. 3 and 12.
Jamaica-ALCOA 1976 Agreement; Yamalcd Joint Venture Agree.
(Official Docviment). Jamaica, October 1976.
Jamaica Bavixite Institute Digest, vol. 1. no. 3 (September
1976), Jamaica Bauxite Institute, Jamaica.
, vol. 2, no. 4. Jamaica Bauxite Institute, Jamaica.
Jamaica Weekly Gleaner, February 20, 1978, Jamaica.
, October 2, 1978, Jamaica.
, November 5, 1979, Jamaica.
Government of Jamaica. Ministry Paper No. 20 (July 2, 1977).
Published by The Agricultural Society, Jamaica.
Higgs, Henry, ed. Palgrave Dictionary of Political Economy,
vol. 2. Macmillan and Co., Limited, London, 1926.
Jefferson, Owen. The Post-War Economic Development of Jamaica.
Institute for Social and Economic Research, University
of the West Indies, Jamaica, 1972.
Keith, Sherry and Girling, Robert. Bataxite Dependency: Roots
of Crisis. Jamaica, May 1978.
Manley, Michael. Policies of Change. Andre Deutch Limited, 1974.
"The Bauxite Story," in A Voice at the Work Place,
Andre Deutch Limited, 1975.
Moffat, Donald N. Economic Dictionary. Elsevier Publishing
Company, New York, 1976.
Monroe, Trevor. "^e Marxist 'Left* in Jamaica 1940-1950
Institute of Social and Economic Research, University
of the West Indies, Jamaica, 1977.
Palmer, Randord W. The Jamaican Economy. Published by Praeger,
New York, 1968.
Pollard, D. E. Producer Associations - The Experience of the
internationaT Baxjxite Association. International Bauxite
Association. February 1977, Jamaica.
78
Report of the U.S. President's Materials Policy Commission.
Resources for Freedom, vol. 1. Government Printing Office,
T9ST.
"The Nationalist Barriers Go Higher," in Business Week
McGraw Hill, New York and New Jersey"! 1970, p. Tib.
Turner, Louis. Multinational Compahies and the Third World.
Published by Hill and Wang, New York, 1973, p. ^TT!
U.S. Bureau of Mines. Mineral Industry Surveys: Bauxite.
U.S. Department of the Interior. The Mineral Yearbook, vol. 1.
Bureau of Mines, 1971-1976.
Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1975.
Welds, Sharman. The Barite Story. Published by Jamal Founda¬
tion, Jamaica, 1978, pp. 5-7.
Wilbur, Charles, ed. "The Political Economy of Development and
Underdevelopment," in The_ Multinational Corporation and
the Underdevelopment of the Third World, 2na ed. Published
by Random House, New York, 1979, pp. 1^4-151.
